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This thesis considers the philosophical importance of the literary form of two aphoristic 
works of philosophy: Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations.  Though both these German-speaking philosophers are widely thought to be aphorists, 
there is little consensus about what exactly is aphoristic about their individual or shared literary 
forms. While their philosophies and forms of aphorisms are quite different in practice, this thesis 
argues that Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s modes of aphoristic expression are essential to their 
philosophical projects in these works. This thesis also explores the particular challenges of 
interpreting aphorisms in a philosophical context. Though aphorisms have various literary qualities, 
their status as discrete pieces of philosophy is of greatest interest here. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
match their piecework form of writing to various philosophical goals they set themselves. Their 
success as highly stylized, aphoristic philosophers is particularly remarkable in light of conventional 
philosophical writing, which is generally conducted in a much less “fragmented” form. By examining 
the styles, forms, structures, rhetorics, and interpretations of these two works, this thesis investigates 
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An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply 
been read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for which is required an art of exegesis.  
--Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Preface §8 
 
 
Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different 
way? I am inclined to say the former. But why?  
--Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations II 181 
 
 
The aphorism is interpretation and the art of interpreting.  
--Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy 31 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 There is a remarkable, still remarkable, pattern in the scholarship on Friedrich 
Nietzsche: introductions to scholarly texts frequently remind us that “Nietzsche’s thinking is 
inseparable from his writing and that coming to terms with his style is essential to 
understanding him at all” (Nehamas 13). While the community of interpreters of fellow 
German-language aphorist Ludwig Wittgenstein has not adopted such truisms to the same 
extent, he is widely thought to be a “writer of unusual powers,” despite “uncertainly about 
whether Wittgenstein’s writing is essential to his philosophizing” (Cavell 21). For both 
philosophers, the first place that scholars often look to evoke the power, particularity, and 
difficulty of their writing is in their aphorisms (or in a highly preliminary definition of the 
term, short and wise sayings). The concept of the aphorism plays an important role, even a 
central role, in characterizing the form or style of writing in many of their best known works. 
And the aphorism has received attention, for each philosopher individually, in arguments 
concerning the necessity of his writing to his philosophy. Yet their philosophies, held to be 
part of two rather different traditions of thought, are manifestly and often deeply divergent on 
mainstream topics of comparison. The most promising strategy to invite these estranged 
philosophers into dialogue – on the level of writing, thought, and what will emerge as a dense 
continuum between these two poles – is to consider their “antiphilosophy”.  
 Antiphilosophy, a term that Alain Badiou deploys to bind these two aphoristic 
“antiphilosophers” together, is indeed “what Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share in common” 
(75).  Both are bent on “unraveling the pretentions of philosophy to constitute itself as a 
theory” while “each in his own turn, [has] set the tone for the twentieth century in terms of a 
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certain form of philosophical contempt for philosophy” (75,74). Though this thesis will not 
broach the vastness of this accusation across their texts, we will locate a great deal of 
“philosophical contempt for philosophy” in the writing (styles, forms, rhetorics) of two of 
their aphoristic works. The main texts under consideration will be Nietzsche’s first book of 
aphorisms, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits (1886), and Wittgenstein’s 
posthumous magnum opus, Philosophical Investigations (1953). In these two books we see 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein attack bedrock conceptions and practices of their discipline, 
blowing conventional philosophy into pieces as they simultaneously deliver their own 
philosophy in aphoristic pieces. While aphorisms have intriguing traits as a loose-knit genre, 
this thesis is most interested in their status as pieces of philosophy, an interest that both 
philosophers openly invite in these works. In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche asks us to 
reflect on its Stückwerk quality– its status as piece-work, part-work, patchwork, piecemeal, or 
as often alleged in a somewhat pejorative manner against aphoristic texts – fragmentary.  
Taking seriously Nietzsche’s insecurity about the wholeness of his work along with similar 
Stückwerk thoughts expressed by Wittgenstein in his preface, we will investigate the means 
and ends of “philosophy in pieces” in Human, All Too Human and Philosophical 
Investigations. Badiou’s pairing of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, though polemically driven, is 
one of the most incisive perspectives for bringing these works together. Largely defanging 
the polemical spirit of his antiphilosophical accusation for our more expository purposes, we 
will return to it on the occasions when Nietzsche and Wittgenstein most plainly violate 
conventional philosophical practice.  
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This thesis is an unconventional study of Human, All Too Human and Philosophical 
Investigations in that is not fundamentally concerned with their exegesis or philosophical 
positions on a certain topic (which might, given this pairing of texts, conceivably fit into the 
philosophy of language or metaphysics). It is more concerned with the possibility of their 
exegesis. This possibility, which appears bound up with their curious aphoristic modes of 
expression, will be filtered through the texts’ practice – and espousal – of style, form, 
method, and interpretation. We will see these aphorists flaunt conventions of philosophical 
argumentation, structure, and systematic writing, often presenting their remarks in a 
tantalizingly incomplete state, making their utterances challenging, sometimes impossible, to 
interpret in a manner that reliably extracts a singular intention from their quotable, all too 
quotable sayings. 
This discussion is best thought of as an analysis rather than a conventional 
interpretation. Instead of pursuing a classic (thematic or synoptic) approach such as 
“Nietzsche on Religion” or “Wittgenstein on Rule-Following”, we will analyze the textual 
machinery that these sorts of interpretations take for granted. One such underappreciated 
textual system is argumentation. It is sometimes alleged that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein do 
not make conventional philosophical arguments: we will see this to be true in Human and the 
Investigations (but in rather different, almost complementary ways). While this discussion 
does make conventional academic arguments, it willingly and intermittently suppresses the 
usual goal of a singular reading of these texts. It must sometimes settle for “raising 
questions”: traditionally, a euphemism for a less-than-persuasive case. As a rejoinder, 
however, it should be said that the tone and methodology will be proper to the landscape of 
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aphoristic philosophy that will emerge. While all major philosophers admit some degree of 
differing interpretation, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein reside together on a pluralistic, hyper-
interpretive extreme. In her preface to (Over)interpreting Wittgenstein, Anat Biletzki 
distinguishes what is strikingly different about the scene of Wittgenstein interpretation as 
compared to most philosophers. Figures such as Plato, Kant, Hume, and Descartes have a 
mainstream interpretation; while the various interpretations admit disagreements, they do not 
feature the incredible, radically divergent understandings that characterize Wittgenstein 
scholarship (7). As Biletzki explains, it is impossible to read Plato, “hero of the forms,” as a 
materialist: yet “Wittgenstein is different” (7) – fundamentally different – from these four 
classic philosophers. 
 And from this discussion’s point of view, so is Nietzsche. We will see exceptionally 
divergent interpretations which seemingly do the impossible and systematize this master of 
unsystematic aphorisms, rendering him as strangely as a materialist Plato. The exceptional 
breadth of interpretation that is so characteristic of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, which 
arguably joins these two aphorists into a rather small and elite club of remarkably 
(over)interpretable philosophers, should be examined in light of their challenging form of 
writing. We should not fully attribute the difficulty of their interpretation to their chosen 
aphoristic forms, or their style in general: this would be unjust to their thought. However, the 
writing of Human, All Too Human and Philosophical Investigations certainly emerges in this 
thesis as essential site of interpretative richness (and frustration). Discarding the dream of a 
classic thematic or synoptic reading for these texts, we better appreciate the literary 
stimulants of their philosophical vigour and the ensuing scholarly fervor.  
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So far we recognize that Wittgenstein and Nietzsche share a certain contempt for 
conventional philosophy along with a reputation for being difficult to interpret – but what 
about their aphoristic careers and their roles in these challenges? Though we will see that 
demarcating Nietzsche’s exact “aphoristic” texts is a more difficult enterprise than it first 
seems, the term has been applied with varying degrees of rigour and to varying parts of 
Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, The Gay Science, Beyond Good and Evil, Twilight of the 
Idols, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nehamas 18).  This thesis will tackle what is widely 
considered to be his first book of aphorisms: Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free 
Spirits. He first published a book by this title in 1878. Somewhat confusingly for Nietzsche’s 
readers he then followed it with Assorted Opinions and Maxims (1879) and The Wanderer 
and His Shadow (1880), but eventually joined these three books in 1886 into a single work 
also called Human, All Too Human (Heller vii). What this discussion subsequently means by 
Human, All Too Human is the complete trio of volume I, comprising the first text, and 
volume two, which contains Assorted Opinions and Maxims (referred to here as II1) and The 
Wanderer and His Shadow (referred to here as II2). This reference scheme comes from the 
main translation used, which is R.J. Hollingdale’s. While the total corpus of Nietzsche’s 
aphorisms is too vast for our considerations, Human, All Too Human is certainly sufficient 
site to observe Nietzsche’s styles in action.  
Moving on to Wittgenstein, we should note that his two most famous works – 
the Tractatus and the Investigations – have often been identified as aphoristic, yet rarely as 
such simultaneously. The Tractatus was completed in 1918 and first published with great 
difficulty in 1921 in German, while Investigations was still incomplete when Wittgenstein 
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died in 1951. It was translated into English by G.E.M. Anscombe, seeing its first publication 
in 1953. Though the history of its composition is long, discontinuous, and varied, it is worth 
noting that remarks §§1-188 – which include the most interesting content for our discussion – 
were already in typescript form in 1937 (von Wright 488). The third (Blackwell) edition of 
Philosophical Investigations (2001) with its side-by-side English and German pages is used 
here. The Investigations will be the central site of Wittgenstein in this discussion, though 
many comparisons will be made back to the Tractatus and its more systematic style. For each 
philosopher the primary consideration will be a single book. That said, we should not hesitate 
to filter our understanding through some of their other texts and a few biographical details.  
 The question of which texts constitute these philosophers’ authoritative or essential 
thought is contentious. Both groups of their readers face similar challenges in assessing the 
relative, fluctuating significance of deliberately published versus unpublished texts. For 
instance, Badiou scorns Wittgenstein’s non-Tractatus texts (162-163), while for Heidegger, 
Nietzsche’s “philosophy proper was left behind as posthumous, unpublished work” (qtd. in 
Van Tongeren 46). Nietzsche is generally held to be the more fragmentary philosopher of the 
two. Yet in terms of publication, we should remember that in Nietzsche’s several 
deliberately-published books of aphorisms he is a more “complete” philosopher than 
Wittgenstein. The later aphorist only finalized and made public a single and very short book 
of philosophy in his lifetime. Though this discussion scarcely has space to consider detailed 
textual histories, both of their Nachlasse are ripe for a critique génétique that would assess 
their fragments of text and thought in genesis and subsequent genetic development. 
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 Beyond these philosophers’ individual textual sagas, what of proper history? We 
should reconsider the gut-feel reaction to the initial pairing of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein on 
historical grounds. For most readers they are not an intuitive pair for topical and disciplinary 
reasons. Can we detect any direct influence at all of Nietzsche (1844-1900) on Wittgenstein 
(1889-1951)? On account of Ray Monk’s widely-read biography of Wittgenstein, he is 
commonly known to have read Nietzsche’s The Anti-Christ, a text that Monk argues 
influenced Wittgenstein’s views on Christianity (121-123).  Bound in the same volume of 
The Anti-Christ were The Case of Wagner and Twilight of the Idols, and based on the 
similarity of a certain aphorism  (the famed “whereof, thereof”) there is evidence to suspect 
that Wittgenstein may have read Human (Westergaard 242). Furthermore, Wittgenstein refers 
to an idea that “Nietzsche writes somewhere” which in fact comes from Human (Culture and 
Value 59, Human §155,I). The possibly of Nietzsche’s influence on Wittgenstein has 
received attention concerning their shared assessment of Wagner’s (lack of) talent and 
Nietzsche’s challenge to Wittgenstein’s faith. However, there has been a scarcity of 
comparisons on conceivable philosophical topics such as how Nietzsche anticipated 
Wittgenstein in rooting the errors of metaphysics in the use language (one of several 
metaphysical problem areas for Nietzsche). This thesis will touch on these points, but it is 
still fundamentally concerned with the written substrates of their (anti)philosophies in 
Human and the Investigations. For our endeavour perhaps the most interesting biographical 
note is that Wittgenstein held Nietzsche to be the “most impressive” author among the 
philosophers (Westergaard 242). Even though this discussion avoids largely questions of 
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direct philosophical or aesthetic influence, Wittgenstein’s esteem for Nietzsche’s writing is 
worth keeping in mind as we see them spurn stylistically normative philosophy. 
 Besides the antiphilosophy of Human and the Investigations, there is at least one 
other conceivable framing narrative for our investigation. The sheer literariness of 
Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s aphorisms invite a duel between philosophy and some form 
of non-philosophy (perhaps, so to speak, its other). Badiou, who is today perhaps Plato’s 
most prominent friend, accuses antiphilosophy of often delving “into the resources that 
sophistics exploit” and traces its origins to the (aphoristic) philosopher Heraclitus (75). It is 
certainly not our task to render Nietzsche and Wittgenstein as sophists. Yet Badiou is right to 
frame them rhetorically. Both of these aphorists, it is often said, avoid making classic 
philosophical arguments, inviting suspicion regarding our compliance with them as readers. 
Nietzsche is one of the most obviously rhetorical modern philosophers and thus has invited a 
sizable number of rhetorical readings. This is unsurprising when we consider his many 
associations with rhetoric. These include his: professorship in philology, study of Greek and 
Roman rhetoric and the ensuing lecture notes he produced, many styles and authorial guises 
across his texts, and remarkably high valuation of style itself (a valuation quite evident in 
Human). For this discussion, Nietzsche’s most important rhetorical dimension in Human 
concerns the character of the philosopher. We will see Nietzsche adopt the ethos of an 
aphoristic anti-systematiser, attacking metaphysics through his ad-hominem jabs at 
metaphysicians and their followers.  
Wittgenstein’s rhetoric, though less manifest, can be seen in his many pedagogical 
tactics of the Investigations. We might say that Wittgenstein is schooling us in “grammar” – 
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one of his more nuanced and extended terms to sure, but still worth considering as a subject 
that is largely taught by example more than explained by theory. His manner of delivery is 
quite curious in the broader context of philosophical writing; philosophy’s instructive 
dimensions still appear underappreciated. Though famous readings have brought rhetoric to 
bear on philosophy in the registers of persuasion (eg. Jacques Derrida on Plato’s persuasive 
writing) and trope (eg. Paul de Man on figural language in Nietzsche), its deployment in 
pedagogy-rich philosophy such as the Investigations has not achieved such notoriety. Even 
beyond pedagogy, Wittgenstein must rhetorically juggle his precarious proclamation that 
philosophy should not advance theories, theses, or explanations with the audience’s suspicion 
that he may be advancing these very things. Though “Wittgenstein’s rhetoric” appears at first 
blush an uncomfortable term, understanding him rhetorically seems less heretical when we 
think of it in terms of (grammatical) teaching rather than (sophistical) persuasion. 
Both aphorists, as we will see, share an oracular rhetoric which alleviates the burden 
of accountability to their remarks when compared to more traditional modes of 
philosophizing.  However, the act of examining the rhetoric of the Investigations and Human 
should not be construed as depicting them as non-philosophers or mistaken philosophers. 
Even with the invitation of Nietzsche’s training in rhetoric, the cause is not to make a 
“rhetorical reading,” in the destructive sense, of these two aphoristic texts. That is say, just 
because they are thoroughly rhetorical does not necessarily make them misguided, or any less 
philosophical.  The rhetorical approach endears itself by exposing the tight textual-
philosophical connections of the Investigations and Human, particularly in regards to their 
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aphoristic units of Stückwerk philosophy. It in this respect, the coherence between writing 
and thought, that our investigation is a rhetorical one. 
Plato’s enduring differentiation of rhetoric (and/or sophistry) versus philosophy as 
instituted in Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Protagoras has quarantined “philosophy’s rhetoric” to a 
less than comfortable category ever since.  Yet we should not forget that Plato also exiled 
literature (under the name of poetry) from his republic. The aphorism, with its long literary 
history, is in a double bind against this powerful ancient vision of philosophy. Not only un-
dialectical, it flourished historically as a potent form of literary expression. Many aphorists 
fall into a crossover category between philosophy and literature. The Nietzsche of Human is 
certainly one of them. While this discussion is concerned with this text’s most philosophical 
pole, many of its aphorisms would be readily anthologized into a book of maxims or life-
wisdom. This is evident in how Human, All Too Human – “the most Gallic of all his 
writing”– represents what has been called a “metamorphosis” of the French aphorism (Faber 
207). Nietzsche read and admired François de La Rochefoucauld’s Sentences et Maximes 
during his writing process, and credits him in (§35,I)  (Faber 206-207). Though Faber 
examines how Nietzsche repurposed the French aphorism to more traditionally philosophical 
ends, Nietzsche’s utterances still bear the literary influence and residue of the French 
moraliste tradition. While our aphoristic investigation seeks the Stückwerk Nietzsche more 
than the literary Nietzsche, we cannot forget his reputation as an ineradicably literary 
philosopher. For decades there have been foreboding warnings of his literary wiles, such as 
his status as a “literary rather than academic philosopher” and “the specific difficulty of 
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Nietzsche’s works: the patent literariness of texts that keep making claims usually associated 
with philosophy rather than with literature” (Russell 789, de Man 119). 
On the level of interpretation, the literariness of Nietzsche endures in some of his 
most famed interpreters associated with French Theory. The literary Nietzsche is gigantic: 
works such as Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962), Nietzsche et la métaphore (1972) , 
Éperons: les styles de Nietzsche (1978), and Allegories of Reading (1979) from Giles 
Deleuze, Sarah Kofman, Jacques Derrida, and Paul de Man barred his philosophical thought  
in a cage of metaphor, style, and rhetoric. Though a generalization to be sure, Nietzsche’s 
figural cage implies that even the most extreme and provocative statements that could be 
made about his aphorisms have already been anticipated.  In effect this means that asserting 
the philosophical importance of Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s aphorisms is conceivably met 
with drastically different reactions from their conceivable groups of readers. Having read the 
aforementioned four books, the conceivable reaction is “so what?”. Yet to Wittgenstein 
interpreters, the claim is likely a more weighty and contentious one. The natural compromise 
to appease both audiences is to target the text themselves, bringing a degree of naiveté about 
their literary extremes.  
 Scholars are still assessing the latent, literary Wittgenstein. He is younger, smaller, 
weaker, but palpably alive: there is now for instance the anthology The Literary Wittgenstein 
(2004).  The literary Wittgenstein -- or at least stylistic Wittgenstein -- commonly inhabits 
the introductions to scholarly books on the Tractatus or the Investigations. In these 
introductory remarks or chapters authors see fit to prepare readers for, or brace them against, 
his incredibly peculiar forms of expression (which differ greatly between these works). A 
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considerable amount of literary interest in Wittgenstein was set off by his remark in Culture 
and Value that “Philosophie düfte man eigenlich nur dichten.” Roughly translatable as 
“philosophy ought really to be written as one writes poetry,” all known translations are 
problematic to the extent that dichten can evoke something fictional but perhaps non-poetic 
(Perloff 716 n3). However, this thesis is not particularly interested in Wittgenstein-as-dichter 
nor a poetic Philosophical Investigations. A better maxim for the current approach to the 
Investigations: philosophy ought really to be written only as one writes pedagogy. 
Wittgenstein’s six years as a troubled elementary school teacher should not be 
underestimated in examining his philosophical and methodological shift between the 
Tractatus and the Investigations (Savickey 50).  Rather than locate a poetic Wittgenstein in 
the Investigations, this discussion pursues the textuality and textbook-ness of his eccentric 
curriculum. That said, we should be mindful of the shifting guises of each German-language 
philosopher as Aphoristiker, Dichter, Schriftsteller, and Autor – the latter terms, “writer” and 
“author”, being ones that Nietzsche attempts to polarize: “The best author will be he who is 
ashamed to become writer” (§192,I). 
Though we ought to focus on the texts themselves, there are several irresistible 
biographical details that illuminate, at least on a figurative level, their aphoristic careers and 
Badiou’s antiphilosophical charge.  Nietzsche’s turn to aphorisms coincided with a major life 
change: leaving his professorship at Basel in 1879 due to ill health and beginning a period of 
wandering (van Tongeren 67). According to his friend Lou Salomé, his later tendency 
towards aphorisms was “forced upon [him] by his illness and the way he lived” (qtd. in van 
Tongeren 67). Three potential factors here – a shift away from the formalities of the 
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academy, poor health that caused impediments in reading and writing at length, and a 
transitory lifestyle – are at least correlated with his aphoristic turn. For much of his career, 
Wittgenstein like Nietzsche had sour ties with academic philosophy, poor (mental) health, 
and a shifting address. Certain biographical commonalties have been directly identified by 
scholars; particularly salient for us is that both were in a “perpetual search for exactly the 
right conditions in which to work” (Heller, The Importance of Nietzsche 143). Since this 
discussion eventually seeks the philosophical necessity of their writing patterns, it is unwise 
to invest in too much weight in these biographical details. However, there is certainly an 
evident figurative parallel between their restless, rather un-academic lives and their sporadic 
writings which attacked the traditional of philosophy. Juxtaposed against the stereotypical 
scholarly life in a fixed place, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein were truly philosophers on the 
lam. Kant, it is often said, never once went far from Königsberg. 
As a last aim for this introduction, an extended metaphor will outline the spirit of this 
approach. The figure is drawn from the same well of scientific metaphors that Nietzsche 
often employs in Human. It presents the workings of a certain widespread scholarly process 
which this thesis finds absolutely imperative but still distinctly unsatisfying. This pervasive 
process happens in philosophy classrooms and in the writing of books and articles (thus 
perhaps in philosophy itself). The activity in question is a conceptual distillation, which 
begins when a philosopher’s complete works are tossed into a great distilling flask. As heat is 
applied, with Nietzsche as our example, something in these works becomes vaporous and 
rises up and out of the flask, then trickles out into a jar with a label such as “The Eternal 
Return”. The temperature jumps up, and then another substance – the atoms or instances of 
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the concept – rises up, out, and into another jar with a label such as “The Will to Power”. 
Sooner or later, we have Nietzsche’s “thought” separated into a finite number of jars, even an 
A-Z list, of his most important ideas, his Key Concepts. Authors, editors, and publishers 
gather up these jars and sell them as a certain kind of book such as Nietzsche: The Key 
Concepts. The philosopher’s ideas, particularly his or her key ideas, are vaporized and then 
condensed into separate liquids, easy to package, distribute, and consume.  
To accomplish this distillation, these great ideas have been fundamentally liberated 
from their texts. Certain obvious things are at risk of being lost in such a distillation, such as 
stylistic variations between texts or historical nuances, though this is not yet the point – but 
here it comes. Moonshiners and chemists, more than the writers of these concept-guidebooks, 
will realize a problematic presupposition of this metaphor. The process just described did not 
involve azeotropes: mixtures of liquids that cannot be separated by normal distillation. In 
reality, even if we are repeatedly distilling the most ancient and desirable of mixtures – water 
and ethyl alcohol – the maximum percentage of ethanol we can ever obtain is only 95.6% by 
weight. Similarly, while we may go a long way in extracting the ethanolic concepts out of a 
philosopher’s aqueous texts, we may eventually find ourselves at the point of azeotropy, 
where we can never eradicate the water from the more desirable alcohol.  The reason to 
consider Nietzsche and Wittgenstein together is that their formidably unique styles, rhetorics, 
and forms of expression – and most perhaps centrally, their Stückwerk, aphoristic approaches 
– have forced their concepts into a profoundly azeotropic relation to their texts. Their jars of 
thought always appear to contain textual impurities. This metaphor is not meant to serve in a 
polemic against the philosophical guidebook – as with ethanol, distillation takes us a long 
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way to an often-useful purification – but only to realize how far we can ultimately go with 
our conventional techniques. One can distill an azeotrope, and boil it entirely, but its 
proportions never change. An azeotrope is a dead-end for conventional distillation, but not 
for analysis. It can still be measured, characterized, illuminated, quantified, and otherwise 
interrogated: that is what this thesis aims to do. 
Ideas of various inseparabilities such as the azeotrope just described are not new in 
philosophy, rhetoric, literature, and discourse in general (eg. form from content, style from 
substance, medium from message). For instance, Roland Barthes famously says that we 
should treat texts like onions, which have an “infinity” of layers, instead of apricots, which 
have a pit (the content) surrounded by flesh (the form) (99). Yet there is something 
seemingly new here: realizing the alarming and particular extent to which a certain 
inseparability is manifest in aphoristic philosophy as represented by two radically different 
figures. This issue is undoubtedly of interest from a literary point of view since aphorisms 
indeed have a rich and ancient literary history well suited to study in a literature department. 
However, the assertion here is that Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s azeotropes are a 
philosophical problem, rather than merely a curious eccentricity of how they packaged their 
thoughts. Form versus content is an incredibly useful distinction in studying philosophical 
texts, and it is certainly used in our discussion. Yet perhaps, in its pervasiveness and utility, 
and in its very ability to differentiate aspects of discourse, it severs an important continuum 
between writing and thought, between text and philosophy. So it is our ultimate task here, at 
least in the Stückwerk Human and Investigations, to thoughtfully evaluate the question we 
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started with: the necessity of the aphorism in Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophizing 






Chapter 2: From Essence to Exegesis 
Though this thesis will eventually raise questions about the methods and 
interpretation of aphoristic philosophy, often taking on a speculative rather than persuasive 
tone, its purpose in the present chapter is to decisively defuse a certain conventional 
approach to aphorisms and aphoristic texts. This approach is largely rooted in an essentialist, 
genre-based, almost metaphysical strategy of examining the aphorism in itself. The approach 
often isolates the aphorisms from their source texts while considering this or that aphorism. 
At the same time, it typically avoids the structural or contextual interrelations between the 
plural aphorisms in the source text. Though this strategy can yield intriguing results, 
particularly on a literary level, it is poorly suited for Human and Investigations. In particular, 
it is poorly suited for a specific, side-by-side understanding of these two works’ interpretive 
conditions and the necessity of their textual form. In the discourse on their literary qualities 
of their works, we will see how the term “aphorism” is capacious in a largely undesirable 
manner, and how “aphoristic” fails to capture the particularity of their fascinating styles.  
Rather than hold up scholars and writers to an absolute measuring stick of “true” 
aphorisms – whether this truth was determined historically, etymologically, by first usage, by 
expertise, or by philosophical essence – this discussion will take shifting, contextual 
measures and then largely discard the question of the essence of an aphorism altogether. 
Without proposing a better family of questions than “what is an aphorism in itself” and its 
kin, we are confined to a richly literary but philosophically unsatisfying scenario. In this 
singular aphorism situation, it will be unclear how a series of weakly connected or 
unconnected Stückwerk units can ultimately constitute a “philosophy” (or as Badiou might 
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have it, a full on anti-philosophical assault). However, in terms of interpretive clarity and not 
of essence, we will soon have good reason to refer to the numbered units of Human as 
aphorisms, and of the Investigations as remarks. This distinction is invited by these 
philosophers’ own references to their writing as well as the typical practices in their scholarly 
traditions. Referring to both philosophers’ units together, we will term them remarks; when 
only referring to Nietzsche, we will “upgrade” his term to aphorism. Such a convention is 
useful because of the latent confusion in the discourse on aphorisms and Wittgenstein’s 
predilection for the term remarks (Bemerkungen) instead of aphorisms. 
Pursuing the aphorism in itself is an affront to the great art of arrangement, one of the 
classical canons of rhetoric but of underappreciated significance to philosophical texts. In 
particular, extracting Wittgenstein’s remarks from his texts and labeling them as timeless and 
seemingly separate aphorisms is an exegetical misrepresentation, perhaps a travesty, of the 
Investigations. Though the text is often held to have a complicated structure, a certain figure 
can be calculated to evoke the written and interpretive vastness of its remarks and their 
interrelations. There are 693 numbered remarks in Part I of the Investigations (and more than 
double this figure across the parts I, II1, and II2 of Human). How effectively, or how 
deliberately, were these remarks arranged? We should consider the enormity of 
Wittgenstein’s options. If he had put each remark on a separate piece of paper, he would have 
more than 3 x 10
1669
 ways of arranging (technically, permuting) these pieces. This 
inconceivably vast number of distinct remark-sequences is more than a thousand orders of 
magnitude greater than the number of atoms in the universe. We will see sequences of his 
remarks that clearly must follow certain orders, while other remarks appear free-standing, as 
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is typical for Human. Few scholars have the stamina and familiarity with Wittgenstein’s 
manuscripts to truly justify his specific sequence in a philosophical or rhetorical sense, and 
we will not have the means nor cause to here. However, given that the Investigations has 
meaningfully sequential stretches, and faced with the numerical vastness of his hypothetical 
arrangements, attempting to isolate his remarks into free-standing aphorisms evidently does 
disservice to the particular composition of the text.  
Nietzsche’s aphorisms, as we will later see in comparison, are considerably easier to 
extract from their particular arrangement in Human. Across his aphoristic works, though, he 
spent considerable time arranging. It has been proposed that he follows Cicero’s five quinque 
officia in his aphoristic composition process, beginning with the inventio of pre-aphoristic 
quotes and ideas, refining them in the intermediate stages till he finally ends with the 
memoria of readily remembered aphorisms (van Tongeren 69). Nietzsche indeed wanted to 
be remembered: as Zarathrustra claims, “Whoever writes in blood and aphorisms does not 
want to be read, but rather to be learned by heart” (35). Though aphorisms are often 
“randomly” pulled out of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein for consideration, little was random 
about their creation. We should forget neither that our Nietzschean aphorisms under 
discussion come from a finished book, nor that Wittgenstein’s unfinished work, constituted 
by what he calls remarks, has a high degree of order. 
Shifting from the written arrangement of the texts to their scholarly study, one further 
numerically-driven concern should be raised. Works on aphoristic texts are an art of 
selection: an art of picking-and-choosing, of assembling aphorisms together for particular 
purposes (a bit like Wittgenstein’s true philosopher, whose work is “assembling reminders 
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for a particular purpose” (§127)). Of course, all scholars must selectively quote passages 
from their texts of study. Yet aphorisms, being typically unbound to an overarching, explicit 
thesis, are particularly ripe to be plucked out and juxtaposed in all sorts of combinations. In 
comparison to the staggering number of arrangements mentioned for Part I of the 
Investigations, it features (a mere) 239,778 possible pairings of remarks for scholars to 
pursue, versus (a still-approachable) 973,710 in Human. The art of exegesis for these 
aphoristic texts is truly an art of selection: we must remember this in general and for our own 
purposes.  
Nietzsche voices this point best:  “The worst readers are those who behave like 
plundering troops: they take away a few things they case use, dirty and confound the 
remainder, and revile the whole” (§137,I). Plundering this aphorism from Nietzsche is not 
meant to accuse anyone of poor reading any more than the present writer: only to emphasize 
that the individual, “representative” aphorism, here as elsewhere, risks excluding its 
outspoken neighbours and perhaps sullying the whole original work. The structure of 
aphoristic works is imperative. Wittgenstein says of the famous decimals that structure the 
Tractatus: “they give the book lucidity and clarity and it would be an incomprehensible 
jumble without them” (qtd. in Monk 181). Recognizing the original place and particularly of 
the utterances is prerequisite for steering the discourse on aphorisms from essence to 
exegesis. 
Beyond its source texts, the aphorism as a category of textual classification is in 
disrepair.  This assessment is confirmed on a general level by the recent work on the 
aphorism (2003, 2012) by Gary Saul Morson, likely the foremost contemporary scholar of 
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this genre, and we will see it to be especially true for Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s texts.  
Calling certain texts or utterances aphoristic often fails to distinguish them from one another: 
an amusing problem since the aphorism, tracing back to the ancient Greek ἀϕορισμός, means 
a distinction or definition (OED “aphorism, n”).  For our purposes this state of disrepair is 
most evident when “aphoristic” fails to classify texts in routine scholarly situations. For 
instance the phrase “Nietzsche’s aphoristic texts” appears unclear; to which publications (or 
notebooks) does “Nietzsche’s aphoristic texts” refer? These texts, as we shift between 
commentators, actually refer to different publications. Thus at face value they fail to denote a 
definite set of Nietzsche’s writings. We can imagine this issue causing unnecessary 
disagreement or confusion among readers who privately envision different sets of “aphoristic 
texts” in their minds, and it has already obscured the art and instance of the German 
aphorisms under discussion. Yet in asking this question of “to which?” we have already 
fallen victim to a grammatical confusion present in the discourse on aphorisms. Taking a cue 
from Wittgenstein’s grammatical methods in the Investigations, we see that some of the 
aphorism’s taxonomic obscurity originates in how adjectives are used in German and 
English. 
Consider the following remark, almost a truism of Nietzsche interpretation, taken 
from the start of the Nietzsche section in a book called Postmodernism and Its Critics: 
Even if we grant that every “strong” writer remakes the work of his predecessors, the 
diversity of ways in which Nietzsche has been “misread” in our century is 
astonishing. The fragmentary, nonsystematic, and often downright contradictory 
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thoughts presented in Nietzsche’s aphoristic texts have helped make his work all 
things to all people. (McGowan 70) 
Ponder the grammar of “aphoristic” here as we sketch out its potential restricting and non-
restricting usage in this passage. This writer is introducing Nietzsche, his work, and his 
interpretation. He thus aims to treat Nietzsche’s texts in general. In one perspective, he 
intends “aphoristic” to be a non-restricting modifier; he slips in “aphoristic” to evoke this 
curious feature of this proto-postmodern philosopher; he might have made other obviously 
non-restricting usages like “copious texts” instead. Yet from another perspective, concerning 
these unrestricted texts perhaps he does not want to say that “fragmentary” thoughts are 
presented in Nietzsche’s finely crafted essays and rigorous philological activities. Only four 
of his published books are what might be called strict aphorism books (Nehamas 18). Thus 
we are inclined to apply “fragmentary” and “nonsystematic” to discussing his manifestly 
discontinuous texts such as Human. So we should consider the “aphoristic texts” to be only 
texts that are aphoristic in nature, i.e. a restrictive usage. Yet “aphoristic” cannot be 
simultaneously restricting and not restricting: the two outlined perspectives are ostensively 
divergent. Whether or not there is a strict contradiction here is not the main concern; the 
point is that “aphoristic,” even at the level of grammar and not of essence, has a problematic 
usage in the discourse on aphorisms. Though we may find clues as to its usage, we cannot 
always go back and correctly replace “aphoristic texts” with “those texts that are aphoristic” 
(restrictive) or “texts, which are aphoristic” (non-restrictive). This grammatical ambiguity is 
generally true of adjectives in both English and German. We might be inclined to say that 
this is not a fundamental problem of the aphoristic, since it could be prevented with diligent 
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grammatical hygiene. Yet it has undoubtedly made the adjective less rigorous over its 
history, since any deliberating restricting usage holds the author accountable to an explicit 
referent, a usage thereby open to scrutiny.  
 The preceding analysis, which curiously considered aphoristic grammar without 
establishing an aphoristic essence, takes several cues from the Investigations. The first cue is 
to consider grammar in the first place. Secondly, we examine the usage of the word instead 
of attempting to house its meaning in some sort of philosophical essence. Thirdly we note 
that “aphoristic”, figuratively and perhaps even in accordance with his scheme, inhabits what 
Wittgenstein might call two “regions of language”. One region concerns the adjective as 
colouring, the other as pointing. Wittgenstein’s investigation indeed aims to clear:  
Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by 
certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. – 
Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this 
may be called an “analysis” of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes 
like one of taking a thing apart. (§90) 
Though this discussion will cease applying Wittgenstein to aphorisms for now, and much 
later shift to his philosophical use of them, invoking this spirit of “taking a thing apart” is 
wise in the face of the arresting obscurity we encounter when hunting the overall essence of 
the Nietzschean or Wittgensteinian aphorism across their works.  
Beyond the abstract grammar of “aphoristic”, its actual taxonomic use in Nietzsche 
and Wittgenstein scholarship cautions us against an essentialism of the aphorism. In the case 
of Nietzsche, “aphoristic works” or “aphoristic texts” is sometimes tossed off as if the reader 
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had consumed his entire corpus and casually recognized which ones are aphoristic. The texts 
these phrases might refer to range from a small set that includes Human (his purportedly first 
aphoristic work) to a great number published since (plus his Nachlass). Given the enormity 
of his manuscripts and the interpretive dilemma of what exactly constitutes his thought, this 
is particularly challenging (is Nietzsche’s notorious umbrella part of his aphoristic 
utterances?) . In the latter case, when the majority of Nietzsche’s total output is “aphoristic,” 
this reference hinges on the existence of an aphoristic property beyond short, deliberately 
type-set expressions. To make this point clear, consider Human, All Too Human in 
comparison to Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The first is composed of numbered and titled 
remarks, ranging in length from a single sentence to a large paragraph; the second is written 
as a narrative.  In his introduction to Human, All Too Human, Erich Heller claims “With the 
aphorisms of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche who had never been a ‘systematic’ thinker, 
has found the form that best suits his intellectual nature. He was not to abandon it again, not 
even in Thus Spoke Zarathustra” (xvii). Despite Zarathustra essentially being a narrative 
(and manifestly not composed of short numbered, i.e. deliberately separated remarks), in 
Heller’s view Nietzsche continues to use the “form” of aphorisms. Thus he must necessarily 
mean a kind of trait that extends beyond the discrete, explicitly contained units commonly 
known as “aphorisms.”  
However, this inclusive classification is not a consensus view of the Nietzschean 
aphorism. In the work Nietzschean Narratives, primarily concerned with the narrative 
elements of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Gary Shapiro argues “it would be a mistake to suppose 
that all of Nietzsche’s works are aphoristic, or that individual aphorisms themselves cannot 
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have a narrative form” (22-23). Shapiro would disagree with the claim that Zarathustra is 
aphoristic (or is in essence aphoristic). This comparison emphasizes that the aphoristic 
(having the form of aphorisms) cannot always rigidly designate a subset of Nietzsche’s 
works. Since we can often unambiguously refer to various periods in the works of 
philosophers and writers – such as early, middle, and late – it is not, at first glance, 
unreasonable to want the same degree of precision for the classification of aphoristic works.  
Our discussion cannot dictate nor classify his true aphoristic texts, but we can certainly try to 
steer the conversation towards his philosophical motivations for writing Stückwerk 
philosophy.   
Given that Wittgenstein’s own deliberately published works are considerably less in 
number than Nietzsche’s, one might expect that the subset of these that are aphoristic might 
be easier to identify. Or, as a seemingly easier task, merely consider the Tractatus and the 
Investigations. Due to their drastically different manners of writing, surely the question of 
which is (more) aphoristic is as obvious as the two texts’ stylistic, structural, and formal 
contrast. Yet a brief survey reveals that this is not the case. Rarely do we find statements that 
explicitly say the one work is aphoristic whereas the other is not; more commonly, the author 
is preoccupied with the stylistics or method of the aphoristic, and focuses on the 
Investigations while neglecting the Tractatus, or vice versa. He or she is preoccupied with 
the “aphoristic” particularities of one of the works and fails to interrelate it to the other, 
implicitly asserting the priority of one work over the over as far as the aphorism is 
concerned. For Badiou (172) and Morson (“The Aphorism” 426-428) the aphoristic core 
appears to be the Tractatus, while this core shifts to the Investigations for Stanley Cavell 
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(172) and Wittgenstein’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry. Perhaps Wittgenstein’s 
aphoristic heart lies in the Investigations because its remarks are so distinct from the 
systematic propositions of the Tractatus – or must it be in the Tractatus with its formidably 
brief and potent sayings, so different than the slow, drawn out passages of his later work? 
 The more one reads articles on Wittgenstein’s method, style, or literariness, the less 
obvious his consummate aphoristic work of philosophy becomes. Of course, we might say 
that both works are equally aphoristic, but this is an unsatisfying evaluation due to their 
striking differences in systematicity, structure, method, and assertion (Tractatus) versus 
interrogation (Investigations).  Furthermore, one of the most concerning things about 
classifying Wittgenstein’s “aphorisms” is his own hesitance to label them as such. 
Wittgenstein was born into a Vienna where aphoristic expression reached considerable 
heights (Gray 85), and much has been made about his literary and philosophical relationships 
with aphorists Karl Krauss and Georg Lichtenberg. It suffices to say that he was quite well 
acquainted with the term and genre of aphorism, yet chose to refer to his units of writing 
largely as “remarks” (Bemerkungen), such as in the preface to the Investigations (ix). And 
when he discusses Krauss alongside himself, he uses “aphorisms” for Krauss’s work and 
“remarks” for his own (Culture and Value 66). Whether Wittgenstein wanted to avoid the 
pretense of upgrading his remarks to aphorisms (an approbation Nietzsche did not hesitate to 
make of his own units) or whether he thought the term to be ill-fitting, extracting a precise 
literary (generic) classification of the Tractatus or the Investigations as constituted by 
aphorisms through his own professed intentions and understanding of the aphoristic genre 
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appears difficult. As we will see later, though, it will be fortuitous to consider the 
Investigations in a structurally “aphoristic,” Stückwerk sense. 
Up until this point we have approached the aphorism in a deliberately circuitous and 
potentially irritating way by targeting the seemingly secondary usage of “aphoristic” instead 
of the aphorism head-on. Conventionally, we could expect that researching the aphorisms of 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein should have a fairly simple two-step process.  First we find what 
“the aphorism” is all about, its definition, its essence, and so on; then we would apply this 
knowledge of the aphorism in comparing and contrasting Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s 
purportedly aphoristic texts. This sort of process could be abstracted to learning about all 
sorts of literary forms and devices and then interpreting them in textual action. However, if 
we proceed with an overly elegant, essentialist understanding of the aphorism, an 
understanding that has become increasingly metaphysical in recent years, then the Tractatus, 
the Investigations, and Human cannot all be said to be composed of aphorisms at once in any 
particularly coherent sense. The stylistic, structural, and hermeneutic differences between 
these three texts stretch out our tidy definitions, as we will see in the next chapter.  The 
whole point here is not to bicker over “true” aphorisms and aphorists, but to examine what 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are up to philosophically when they write books of numbered 
remarks – remarks that have a curious and underappreciated relation to each other and to 
their philosophical projects, in addition to whatever adherence or deviance they bear to their 
supposed aphoristic form.  
Wittgenstein tells his readers: “What we do is bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use” (§116). And this, in a sense, is what “we” are doing too: 
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bringing the word “aphorism” back from its metaphysical history to its non-metaphysical 
function as the constitutive unit of Human and the Investigations. Though aphorism is not an 
“everyday” sort of word, Gordon Baker makes the case that Wittgenstein uses everyday to 
mean non-metaphysical instead of truly ordinary (“Metaphysical/Everyday Use” 92). 
Important to the Wittgenstein’s use of “metaphysical” is that metaphysics concerns the 
essence or nature of things, and expresses conditions of necessity and possibility (97). This 
thesis will take a (at least figurative) cue from Wittgenstein here, and reconstitute the 
aphorism around its practical deployment and neighbourly relations. We are looking for the 
philosophical “grammar” of aphorisms. 
Perhaps thus far in our discussion the spectre of an essentialist understanding of the 
aphorism is overly abstract or appears an empty threat. To demonstrate how such an 
understanding of the aphorism will get us into trouble with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, we 
can turn to the work of Gary Saul Morson, who is likely the world’s leading scholar of short 
sayings. While his recent book The Long and Short of It: From Aphorism to Novel (2012) 
resolves some of the classification problems that will be outlined shortly, it is instructive to 
examine his article “The Aphorism: Fragments from the Breakdown of Reason” (2003) since 
it amply illustrates the difficulties scholars have encountered in pinning down the essence of 
the aphorism. Recently, he writes “I do not aspire to be the Northrop Frye of short genres and 
offer the definitive classification to supplant or forestall all others. ... Choose a different set 
of questions and you will arrive at a different classification” (5). He is well aware of the 
muddled state of terminology for short sayings, so he aims to first group the sayings and then 
apply a term out of convenience (4). In the discussion of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, we will 
 
 29 
be indeed choosing a “different set of questions”: yet not with the aim of re-classifying their 
short sayings, but of eventually dissolving the problem of classification altogether as we turn 
to interpretation in Chapter 3 and their antiphilosophical projects in Chapter 4. 
Morson articulates “the basic worldview of the aphorism by contrasting with an 
opposite form, the dictum” (411).  For Morson, the aphorism is, in essence, mysterious: “The 
aphorism, like god’s sign, does not contain but points beyond itself, step by potentially 
endless step. It is a mystery” (413). Later, he presents the dictum: “Unlike aphorisms, dicta 
see no mystery. They precisely resemble the solution to a riddle ... The dictum announces the 
discovery and specifies its essential nature. Its sense is: mystery is at last over. ... In direct 
contrast to the aphorism, the dictum typically tells us that things are not so complex as people 
have thought” (416). Summarizing more of Morson’s remarks, the dictum is certain and 
totalizing, aiming for clarity and axiomaticity (417-418). He provides many examples of 
aphorisms and dicta, seemingly setting us up with useful tools for extracting the essence of 
the aphoristic in Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Morson even devotes considerable attention to 
the Tractatus; its concluding remarks “precisely exhibit the aphoristic consciousness” that his 
article is forwarding (425). He sees the book’s “propositions turn into aphorisms” (426) and 
picks out 6.41, 6.42, and 6.421 for further attention. Indeed the famous last two remarks of 
the Tractatus may in fact “be taken to apply to the aphorism as a genre” (428).  
 Unfortunately, Morson’s early model (2003) breaks down when faced with the 
“ordinary use” of “aphorism” as it relates to Nietzsche.  If our language concerns the history 
of the aphorism, then according to Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning, we will perhaps 
find “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (§43).  Nietzsche, likely the most 
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philosophically influential “aphorist” of all time, is conspicuously absent from his paper. 
Perhaps this is because Nietzsche, in Morson’s two-part model, would be a writer of dicta 
and not of aphorisms. Many remarks of Human are rather unmysterious judgments and 
criticisms, straightforward instances of praise, blame, and moralistic assertion. Nietzsche, 
even to the lay person, is renowned for loudly pronouncing where things went wrong (with 
religion, morality, and so on). This is not Morson’s mode of the aphoristic, which is a rather 
mystical one. For example, he cites as aphorisms: “The heart has its reasons, which reason 
knows nothing of” (Pascal), “Is it possible to perceive as shape what has no shape?” 
(Dostoevsky), and Wittgenstein’s famous mystical statement of the Tractatus, “There are, 
indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what 
is mystical.” (6.522) (qtd. in Morson 420). While we could turn up a few mystical statements 
from Nietzsche, they are not representative of his general tone.  
 Beyond the issue of which philosopher is the more archetypical aphorist, there is also 
the early Wittgenstein versus the later. For Morson, the aphoristic core of Wittgenstein 
appears to be at the end of the Tractatus (compare this to Cavell, who locates it 
Investigations). Morson even ends his article – which is written as a series of numbered 
remarks – with the Wittgensteinian saying-showing “aphorism”:  
19. The dictum says Something. The aphorism shows Something Else. (428) 
In his book The Long and the Short of It, Morson elegantly tidies up some of these 
classification problems. He essentially replaces the aphorism with the apothegm, so that the 
apothegm and the dictum form an opposing pair. The aphorism becomes, instead of a highly 
specific type of saying, a family of sayings that includes the apothegm and the dictum. In this 
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new model, since aphorism is a more inclusive category, we could say that Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein both wrote aphorisms. However, Morson actually treats Human in his section 
on “the thought,” a genre he opposes to “the summons” (195,199). Ultimately Morson’s 
classification process is as intriguing as it is interminable.  His system – which to be fair 
makes no claims of rigorous systematicity or authoritativeness – cuts across philosophy and 
literature. Yet it seems a system born of aphorisms already extracted from their source texts; 
it does not consider the aphorism’s interrelations with its original neighbours. Certainly one 
could classify each entry in The Oxford Book of Aphorisms into a variety of different species, 
but this project does not necessarily contribute to the exegetical dilemmas in texts such as 
Human and the Investigations, dilemmas that their unitized and quasi-aphoristic structures 
have made all the more difficult. 
By this point it should be clear that we have reason to avoid a certain kind of 
conventional confrontation with aphorisms that investigates the aphorism in itself while 
loosely using its adjective. Though an aphoristic style is still an intriguing prospect, we ought 
to consider the adjective in a structural, philosophical register beyond literary tone. 
Ultimately, we must avoid being zoologists who claim to find the same species of animal on 
two continents without studying the specimens’ local ecosystems and communal behaviour: 
if the first location’s specimen is a herding creature, and the second location’s specimen is a 
lone hunter, could they really be of the same species at all? We will soon observe 
Wittgenstein’s remarks herding together in familial packs while Nietzsche’s aphorisms hunt 





Chapter 3: Two Arts of Exegesis, One Rhetoric of Incompleteness 
 
Nietzsche asks for an “art of exegesis” for the aphorism; Wittgenstein invests in 
questions of interpretation in Investigations (as such, and as rule-following). From the outset, 
their individual concerns with interpretation appear to anticipate their subsequent plurality of 
scholarly interpretations. Despite the broadness of this scene, progress can be made towards 
the specific interpretive conditions of Human, All Too Human and Philosophical 
Investigations by means of a striking contrast between them. Aphorisms are often held to be 
context-free utterances: this chapter will explore the palpable but contrasting limitations of 
this generalization for these two works. The essential hermeneutic difference between 
Human and the Investigations can be largely abstracted away from the books’ professed 
subject matters – i.e. we could infer this difference without a deep understanding of the texts 
– yet has important rhetorical-philosophical consequences for determining Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein’s methods. The difference is as follows: while Wittgenstein’s remarks are 
semantically and grammatically contingent on their immediate predecessors, Nietzsche’s are 
not. 
 In interpretive practice, this distinction will mean that if we are randomly handed one 
of Wittgenstein’s remarks with nothing else to go on, we are at grave risk of not 
misunderstanding it, but simply not understanding it. For instance, we will have no idea for 
what a certain pronoun stands in, or with what a seemingly contrasting remark is contrasting. 
If we are handed §538 for instance, which begins “There is a related case,” we ask – a related 
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case to what? On the other hand with Nietzsche, every numbered aphorism forms a complete 
grammatical universe, free of ambiguous pronouns, except in quite rare cases when 
Nietzsche directly continues a thought across numbered remarks (most conspicuously, in 
§§35-38, §§132-135, §§629-637, I). If we were only to read Nietzsche’s odd-numbered 
remarks, skipping the even ones, the result would simply be less Nietzsche, but not Nietzsche 
gravely disfigured: the same cannot be said of Wittgenstein. Though certainly Philosophical 
Investigations is not an outright continuous philosophical work, the sometimes-direct 
continuity of its remarks and its back-references make it more like a pedagogical lesson in 
terms of its textual-temporal contingency and less like Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human, 
which is more akin to an anthology of poetry, since instead of developing contingently, its 
apprehension starts again and again with each remark. 
One almost needs a linguistic or psychological theory of reading to make this 
hermeneutic difference rigorous and clear, but a reasonable ad-hoc distinction between the 
interpretative approaches necessary for the Investigations and Human should suffice. 
Consider the two following definitions for a text passage’s context sensitivity, where in our 
case the passage in question is always a numbered remark: 
Conceptual context sensitivity: a general knowledge of the topics of discussion 
surrounding the passage is question, which is derived from past learning outside the given 
text: in particular, knowing something about the proper nouns. 
Textual context sensitivity: A specific knowledge of what immediately precedes the 
passage in question in the text along with its grammatical interrelations: in particular, 
knowing the pronoun substitutions and past textual examples. 
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The first task here will be to argue that Human, All Too Human primarily demands 
conceptual context sensitivity while Philosophical Investigations primarily demands textual 
context sensitivity. There is a parallel to what is called exophoric and anaphoric and 
reference in linguistics. Roughly speaking, exophora references outside-the-text, while 
anaphora references inside-the-text. Though tenable, for our purposes this distinction is a bit 
too linguistically technical, and it is a distinction drawn more from semantics than from 
hermeneutics. To give these two claimed contexts an easier connotation: the conceptual 
context sensitivity ideal for Nietzsche is best associated with history; the textual context 
sensitivity ideal for Wittgenstein is best associated with the text’s internal pedagogy.  
Let us begin with history. If an intelligent person attempted an exegesis of Human, 
All Too Human without an encyclopedia or the like, fluent in English or German but with 
little knowledge of European intellectual, cultural, and religious history, he or she would 
have a fundamental problem. The naive exegete would not recognize Beethoven, Calvin, 
Democritus, Demosthenes, Diogenes, Don Quixote, Electra, Erasmus, Hesiod, Horace, 
Goethe, Kant, La Rochefoucauld, Machiavelli, Plato, Schopenhauer, Thucydides, Voltaire, 
Wagner, or Xerxes. This exegete would not have the religious context necessary for 
understanding Nietzsche’s rebellion in his chapter “The Religious Life” nor the philosophical 
context for his anti-metaphysical thinking that we will pursue in our next chapter.  Historical 
context, particularly when it comes to philosophy, is indeed imperative for interpreting 
Human, All Too Human, just as it was for Nietzsche as he was writing it. He claims “lack of 
historical sense is the family failing of all philosophers” (§7), a remark that anticipates his 
later and enormously influential concept of the genealogy. Nietzsche, whose career began as 
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a classical philologist, is widely regarded as a particularly historical philosopher. This 
assessment is particularly striking in comparison to Wittgenstein and his erratic, largely non-
academic philosophical education.  Though the reading-lists of these two German-speaking 
philosophers overlap on certain key figures such as Schopenhauer, identifying historical 
influences –especially pre-nineteenth century influences – is a relatively fruitless endeavour 
in the Investigations when compared to Human. 
Wittgenstein’s network of external references is indeed far less extensive than 
Nietzsche’s. Out of the 693 remarks comprising Part I of the Investigations, only eleven 
reference specific philosophical texts (Fischer and Ammereller xiv).  Though a highly 
challenging and complicated work, it is elementary in a way that most contemporary 
philosophy is not: it begins with elements (rudiments) so that a sufficiently dedicated reader 
can plough through it (few would expect a textbook called Elementary Calculus to be an easy 
read for a beginner in the subject, yet it should be adequate in itself to foster learning). Thus 
understanding Wittgenstein is an intrinsically accumulative process. Unlike many 
contemporary philosophy articles, an amateur reader need not give up in the face of 
unfamiliar jargon and undefined terms. Wittgenstein’s style and philosophy have indeed been 
called “pedagogical” (Peters and Burbules). Of course, this does not mean that Philosophical 
Investigations has all the usual helpful aids of a textbook (such as lucid definitions, chapters, 
and formatting). Its stretches of continuity are broken by new “chapters,” though never 
typographically indicated as such (according to the preface, he is apt to “sometimes make a 
sudden change, jumping from one topic to another”).  However, just as with a textbook, his 
student gains proficiency by answering a series of questions – more than 800 of them, for 
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very few of which Wittgenstein provides answers (Peters and Burbules). Wittgenstein did in 
fact refer to the work as “a textbook, however, not in that it provides knowledge, but rather in 
that it stimulates thinking” (qtd. in Savickey 1). In the way that the Investigations eschews 
extensive historical reference in favour of its own, largely accumulative pedagogical scheme, 
we see its aim of being understood on its own, everyday terms. This is a markedly different 
scenario than Human, in which Nietzsche both commands and requires historical proficiency 
in philosophy and European culture. 
Though this discussion is articulating a pedagogical hermeneutic for Investigations, it 
should pointed out that at the beginning of Wittgenstein’s formal philosophical career in the 
Tractatus, he was a bad teacher despite his palpable brilliance. The pedagogical thrust of 
Investigations is marked change from the Tractatus, which immediately in its preface claims 
that it is “not a textbook” (3). While Wittgenstein believed that the Investigations “stimulates 
thinking,” the Tractatus famously speculates in its preface that it “perhaps will only be 
understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed 
in it – or similar thoughts”. In terms of its accessibility around the time of its publication, the 
Tractatus was the opposite of a textbook: it was effectively a code-book, in the sense that 
even a genius would need Wittgenstein’s own key to unlock it. As he wrote to Bertrand 
Russell in 1919:  
“in fact you would not understand it [the Tractatus] without a previous explanation as 
it’s written in quite short remarks. (This of course means that nobody will understand 
it; although I believe it’s clear as crystal. But it upsets all our theory of truth, of 
classes, of numbers, and all the rest.)” (qtd. in Nordman 96) 
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 The aims of his writing being (publically) understandable and being clear were evidently 
different things for the early Wittgenstein. In a pragmatic sense, a work is not understandable 
if its original – and in this case, brilliant – audience missed the point. His instance on the 
ultra-short remarks in the Tractatus is all the more striking in the face of this difficulty, and 
we will see him increase their length, number, and verbosity Investigations. Though many 
scholars have variously identified “aphoristic” qualities in one work or the other, to insist that 
both works are both composed of aphorisms may blunt the force of what is fair to call the 
pedagogical improvement in the manner of his philosophical delivery.   
The change in how Wittgenstein envisioned the receptions of his two canonical 
works, his pedagogical turn, is manifest in many rhetorical and written categories of the 
Investigations. These include his increased willingness to expand on points, dwell on 
mistaken perspectives, intersperse the interrogative with the declarative, and furnish his 
reader-student with examples. Though Terry Eagleton characterizes the Investigations as a 
“thoroughly dialogical work,” Wittgenstein writes in Culture and Value that the dialogues of 
Socrates were a “waste of time” because they “clarify nothing” and use key words in an 
exceptional rather than an ordinary way (qtd. in Peters and Burbules). Rather than the 
classically dialectical, push and pull forces which reveal the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of a thing, it can be suggested that Wittgenstein’s pedagogy follows a strategy of 
“family resemblance” [Familienähnlichkeit]. This famous term, “crucial to Wittgenstein’s 
attack on essentialism,” may oddly be traced back to Nietzsche who uses it in Beyond Good 
and Evil (Glock 120). Wittgenstein uses the term to describe, like the traits of a real family, 
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“a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail” (§66).  
While family resemblance is typically bound to his concept of language-games, it 
also figuratively characterizes his written and rhetorical patterns on the level of each remark. 
In the preface he refers to his “criss-cross” patterns of his thought in the context of his un-
united “philosophical remarks”. In a typical sequential grouping of remarks, we indeed often 
see a “network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” though we are rarely sure if 
they are “overall similarities” or “similarities of detail”. Though perhaps a tendentious 
application of Wittgenstein’s thought to the structure of his remarks, it seems a more 
reasonable metaphor in light of Nietzsche’s aphorisms. Nietzsche’s units in Human present 
the interpretive confidence that each aphorism begat itself, versus Wittgenstein’s remarks 
where we cannot be as sure of their familial relations to their neighbours in a given sequence. 
Without help from his manuscripts, his student is not quite sure where his examples can 
“broken off”, a property that he claims his examples have in §133. 
Despite this obscurity, we should be sure to note the improvement from the Tractatus 
to the Investigations in the area of accessibility. Through its distinctive form of “ordinary” 
dialogue and grammar-rich, ostensive pedagogy, the Investigations is a less elitist work than 
the Tractatus in the sense that its form of expression allows entry for the philosophical 
novice – not a gentle entry, but certainly a possible opportunity to “stimulate thinking.” We 
can see a parallel between the elite logical skill required to understand the Tractatus near its 
publication and what Sarah Kofman regards as the “rigorous philological art” required to 
understand Nietzsche. She claims “aphoristic writing also aims to discourage the common by 
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requiring a reader to be equipped with a rigorous philological art. Aphoristic writing wants to 
make itself understood only by those who are linked by having the same refined impressions 
in common; it wants to banish the profanum vulgus” ( 114-115). Yet shifting from the 
Tractatus to the Investigations, the prerequisites for understanding Wittgenstein relaxed from 
the demands of having “already thought the thoughts expressed” in the work  -- from already 
“having the same refined impressions in common” -- as he developed a more inclusive and 
dialogical procedure. Yet owing to this turn, textual context sensitivity becomes all the more 
important for interpreting Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the Investigations. Instead of 
approaching each remark at an elite level of logical skill as with the Tractatus, we can rely 
upon certain continuities across the “curriculum” of the Investigations which allow us to 
slowly accumulate an understanding.  With the help of an astute pattern analysis by Gordon 
Baker, we can see one such continuity, an important example of textual context sensitivity, 
weaving its way through the work. 
A grasp of scope – that is, the extent to which is discussing the same concept, usage, 
or sense across remarks– is imperative for the Investigations. Baker’s incisive article “Italics 
in Wittgenstein” is a remarkable instance in Wittgenstein scholarship where a seemingly 
textual or “rhetorical” feature – in the sense that italics often serve as an emphatic gesture – 
turns out to be of philosophical importance. Going back to the metaphor of this discussion’s 
introduction, we might say this is an important “azeotrope” of Philosophical Investigations.  
Through this pattern analysis he differentiates four different types of italic usages, which can 
hypothetically “generate four readings for any italicized expression in any italicized remark” 
(Wittgenstein’s Method 246). According to Baker’s analysis, the remark “Following a rule is 
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a custom” (a paraphrase of §199) could be parsed in four ways (246). An example of this 
scheme is as follows. Consider the sentence “Following a rule is, [X], a custom” and 
substitute one of the four phrases for X: 
1. really    2. in our sense   3. in a certain sense   4. as it were 
Though Baker does a much more thorough job of explaining these differing italicizations and 
their implications than this brief example can hope to capture, what is important for our 
purposes is that these usages have weighty implications for interpreting Wittgenstein across 
his remarks. While usage (1) is emphatic, (2) and (3) are sensitive to the scope. For example, 
in the discussion on reading in §§156-71, Wittgenstein fixes a certain sense of “read” through 
his italicizations in §§156-62; without this back-referencing the discussion would not make 
sense (Baker 229). This is case (2), where Wittgenstein is developing reading in our sense, a 
sense that spans many remarks. By pinning down one of the four italic usages, we come to 
understand the sameness of reading in Baker’s exegesis. 
   Wittgenstein’s patterns of italics are a specific interpretive tool, but they have general 
significance in exemplifying how very textual modern philosophy can be. In an interesting 
juxtaposition of Wittgenstein’s italics and Derrida’s frequent practice of striking through 
words (putting them sous rature), Baker emphasizes the importance of a deeply textual 
Wittgenstein (226). This is not to suggest that scholars have ignored the letter of his texts. 
Wittgenstein is surely far less flamboyant and textually playful than Derrida:  yet here we 
have a (stylistically conservative) scholar analyzing the typeface of philosophy. To borrow 
Richard Rorty’s phrase for Derrida, Baker’s devotion to Wittgenstein’s italics illuminates 
“philosophy as a kind of writing” (emphasis added). 
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While it might be problematic to lay out a full set of criteria for an “adequate” 
exegesis of a certain remark, the general point so far is this: for Wittgenstein, we must 
generally look back in the text, understand his examples, attempt his questions, and so on – 
yet for Nietzsche, no amount of close reading of Human, All Too Human will reveal all its 
cultural, intellectual, and religious prerequisites if we are not already familiar with them. 
That is not to say that we should never situate a Wittgenstein remark in front of a certain 
historical backdrop, or never backtrack while looking for threads of continuity in Nietzsche. 
Only that the texts themselves ask this of us in their construction, and what was withheld in 
their construction. The art of withholding will grow into a major theme of this thesis for both 
philosophers, and will take on several guises. We will soon see that Wittgenstein already 
began a process of withholding in the Tractatus. 
Stanley Cavell writes a piece called “The Investigations’ everyday aesthetics of 
itself” which argues that the text’s “literariness”  and “aesthetics” cannot be understood from 
outside the work (21). Though the aesthetic of the Tractatus is rather contrary to the 
“everyday,” his first work was conceived with an interiority equally formidable to the one 
Cavell investigates. The Tractatus was to be understood in its minimalistic selfhood, a work 
in Wittgenstein’s words “philosophical and at the same time literary, but there is no babbling 
in it” (qtd. in Monk 177). Despite writing supplementary remarks for the Tractatus  – extra 
comments that his peers would have eagerly accepted – Wittgenstein resolutely refused to 
have them printed: “The supplements are exactly what must not be printed. Besides THEY 
REALLY CONTAIN NO ELUCIDATIONS AT ALL” (qtd. in Monk 207). Though 
historicized interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy have emerged, his tenacity for 
 
 42 
demanding to be understood ahistorically and internally to his texts is unforgettable, and all 
the more striking in comparison to Nietzsche’s urging towards “historical philosophizing” 
(§276, I) and the autobiographical details of his suffering in Human, All Too Human. 
As is evident even by flipping through the many pages of the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein eventually relaxed the austerity of his writing by being vastly more thorough 
and ostensive (though we should partially attribute this to his editors on account of its 
posthumous publication and the controversial status of its second part). However, 
Wittgenstein also enormously loosened the structure of the Investigations when compared to 
the Tractatus, and this structural shift poses considerable interpretive challenges. The 
question of how to interpret the remarks of Philosophical Investigations, with their 
complicated, contingent logic, can be approached by means of an imaginary hypothetical 
diagram. A truly thorough exegesis of the work might include an intricate diagram that 
continues down the margin of each page and onto the next, showing the accumulation of key 
conceptual threads from their textual inception to their end (something like the various 
epochs in geological diagram).  
If we had such a diagram, we could readily determine which “layer” a given remark is 
buried in, i.e. the scope of textual context – then we could interpret each remark with respect 
to a definite textual expanse. The Tractatus, unlike the Investigations, has a something of a 
natural visualization: we simply “tab in” with each decimal place added, and “tab out” when 
they are removed.  At the very least, in the Investigations it would be fortuitous to realize 
when we “drop into” and “step out of” each lesson (a hypothetical language-game: upon 
reading a remark in Philosophical Investigations, decide whether it is a “drilling down” or a 
 
 43 
“fresh start” with respect to the previous remark). However, if it true that sequences of 
remarks have a property of “family resemblance” as suggested earlier, a great difficulty 
emerges. We could not possibly impose a Tractarian structure on the Investigations, since the 
familial interrelations obscure the necessary and sufficient conditions for a remark to be 
directly subordinate to its predecessor.  
 Thus far in the discussion, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein’s remarks have been 
distinguished along the lines of the context-sensitivity from the perspective of a reader or 
interpreter. Yet they themselves demonstrate a palpable interest in interpretive imbroglios. In 
particular, they both respect the opportunity of interpreting a remark that has an incomplete 
context and execution. The issue of how to approach sentences or short ideas that have no 
proper context is imperative in aphoristic philosophy, for it is a distinctive burden placed on 
the reader. No proper context, in this discussion of aphorisms and their kin, should be taken 
to mean that the context is not explicit: that is, the aphorism and its ideal context are up for 
interpretation (our aims thus far have indeed been to sketch out such ideal contexts).  
However, as we will see in examples from the Investigations and Human, the art of 
discovering context is not just one of research, but of invention. Consider the following 
pairing of remarks from the two philosophers, both concerned with interpretation. 
Wittgenstein begins the following remark with a dropped-in quote, which has no previous 
context or relevance to Philosophical Investigations: 
525. “After he had said this, he left her as he did the day before.” – Do I understand 
this sentence? Do I understand it just as I should if I heard it in the course of a 
narrative? If it were set down isolation I should say, I don’t know what it’s about. But 
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all the same I should know how this sentence might perhaps be used; I could myself 
invent a context for it. 
(A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every direction.) 
And here is Nietzsche: 
178 .The effectiveness of the incomplete. – Just as figures in relief produce so strong 
an impression on the imagination because they are as it were on the point of stepping 
out of the wall but have suddenly been brought to a halt, so the relief-like, incomplete 
presentation of an idea, of a whole philosophy, is sometimes more effective than its 
exhaustive realization: more is left for the beholder to do, he is impelled to continue 
working on that which appears before him so strongly etched in light and shadow, to 
think it through to the end, and to overcome even that constraint which has hitherto 
prevented it from stepping forth fully formed. 
As might be expected, Wittgenstein’s concern with incompleteness is more semantic, and 
Nietzsche’s is more aesthetic or artistic. The scope of Wittgenstein’s statement operates on 
the level of a sentence, while Nietzsche’s scope ranges from “an idea” (perhaps an aphorism) 
to “a whole philosophy”. Yet both aphorists realize the fortuitousness of ambiguity, or at 
least that they are not in an impasse: while Wittgenstein could take the unknown sentence 
and “invent a context for it,” Nietzsche is “impelled to continue working on that which 
appears before him.” Both remarks are lucid anticipations of the reception of their 
originator’s aphoristic works. Each philosopher has left behind him a monumental project of 
understanding his isolated “sentences” (remarks), of leaving scholars to place them “in the 
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course of a narrative,” perhaps studiously or tendentiously “invent[ing] a context” for these 
isolated ideas.  
  Applied to the case of Philosophical Investigations’ “incomplete presentation”, 
Nietzsche is correct that “more is left for the beholder to do” – more work is left for the 
interpreter – and perhaps as a partial consequence, we are left with the monumental heap of 
interpretations we know today. In (Over)interpreting Wittgenstein Biletzki does not bestow 
much blame on Wittgenstein’s style or “incompleteness” for the vast divergences between 
the many readings he has received. Yet by juxtaposing the interpretive immensity of her 
reading-of-readings with the specific textual and contextual challenges we have already seen 
in the Investigations, we have a preliminary, intuitive reason to suggest such a linkage. That 
said, it is a more difficult attribution to make for Wittgenstein than for Nietzsche: the earlier 
philosopher and his interpreters are far more comfortable with interpretive pluralism and the 
“perspectivism” of his styles. 
Can we as readers even hold these aphorists accountable for clarifying what they 
mean? Perhaps the phrase “what they mean” is a poor one, since both these philosophers are 
more concerned with the (therapeutic or rhetorical) activity of philosophy and its 
practitioners than with the dispensing of determinate philosophical meaning: for the 
antiphilosopher, philosophy is not a theory but an “act” (Badiou 75). We might still ask,  
though, that they be held accountable to cutting down the blatant misunderstandings of their 
texts. The value of interpretive pluralism aside, there are better and worse ways of 
discovering what they “mean” by their statements that supplant philosophical theory with 
act.  In pursuing this accountability, the rhetoric of incompleteness in Nietzsche’s and 
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Wittgenstein’s remarks should not go unmentioned. One might say that at work here is a kind 
of oracular rhetoric, or riddle rhetoric, in which the speaker impresses the importance of the 
message through the necessity of its careful interpretation or extension. Indeed solving a 
riddle is a bit like “invent[ing] a context” for a sentence: discovering where the phrase 
“walks on four legs in the morning, two legs in the afternoon, and three legs in the evening” 
is intelligible (in man, as Oedipus replies to the Sphinx). Similar to a riddle, the act of simply 
reading or hearing the remark does not inherently decipher it. As Nietzsche warns us, “An 
aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been ‘deciphered’ when it simply has been 
read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis” (GM preface §8). When an isolated sentence 
or remark is presented, the speaker can thereafter go silent on the issue, leaving the 
interpreter with at least three conceivable options. Firstly, one could understand the remark in 
and of itself – if such a thing is even possible (can even we picture a remark with no context 
whatsoever?). Secondly, one could work within the immediate textual context, as with 
Wittgenstein, and thirdly, with an extra-textual historical context, as with Nietzsche. Yet all 
three are problematic in that the speaker is not immediately nor inherently accountable for 
clarifying or justifying the remark, particularly in regards to an overarching (essayistic) thesis 
that could be attached on the holistic, totalizing level of a chapter or book.  
The status of our philosophers as conventional authors should be brought into 
question to the extent that an author has authority and consequent accountability. As Sarah 
Kofman notes on Nietzsche in a pluralistic, poststructuralist vein: “it is not the fault of the 
‘author’ if his aphorisms fail to be understood” (116). In Human, Nietzsche dashes off many 
one-sentence aphorisms and quickly leaves the scene, immediately shifting the burden of 
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understanding to the reader since no further clarification is possible. In the next chapter, we 
will witness him making hit-and-run attacks at metaphysics and systematic philosophy. 
Nietzsche’s aphoristic form, so short and nimble, prevents his thought from being 
interrogated for an understanding in the same way as, for example, Kant.  In both Human 
and the Investigations, we can certainly read a long series of numbered remarks, attempt to 
distill a thesis from them, and then hold the remark in question accountable to that 
overarching thesis.  Yet because of this circularity, the speaker who voices the remark is not 
accountable to its letter: only to the spirit, which someone else has extracted.  
Kofman goes so far as to posit that aphoristic expression eventually “deconstructs the 
idea of author as master of the meaning of the work and immortalizing himself through it” 
(116). Toning down her claim for our purposes, we should note the very practical uncertainty 
among Wittgenstein interpreters concerning who is “the master of the meaning” of the 
Investigations. Consider the case of Saul Kripke, whose book Wittgenstein on Rules and 
Private Language is widely regarded as one of the greatest interpretations that the 
Investigations has ever received. Kripke’s interpretation has been dubbed “Kripkenstein” – a 
portmanteau -- a Frankenstein-ing of these two philosophers’ names. Yet the name of this 
hybrid philosopher, it seems, expresses an uncertainty about how much of Kripke’s brilliant 
interpretation was “there to begin with” in Wittgenstein: perhaps “Kripkenstein” might only 
be “Wittgenstein” had the first philosopher accompanied his remarks on rule-following with 
a statement of “this is what I’m trying to do; this is my theory; this is my explanation”.  We 
will see, however, that this kind of (thesis-based) accountability is antithetical to 
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Wittgenstein’s spirit of philosophy’s putting-everything-before us, as famously advanced in 
§§126-128.  
While evaluating the fidelity of Kripke’s interpretation is here an impossible task, one 
might be inclined to suggest that there are two great “masters of the meaning” at work in 
“Kripkenstein” – and two rival masters, in a sense, means no master at all.  Scholars have 
been persuaded to read books such as Human and the Investigations on account of the 
authors’ palpable intelligence and the utility of the (plural) interpretations they generate.  
However, it appears that readers are simultaneously hailed into a rhetorical relationship with 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein where their multifarious richness of interpretative possibility 
conceals a certain philosophical lack of accountability. While they allow for great readings, 
perhaps consistent readings, in this hyper-interpretive scene we should wonder who is really 
doing more philosophizing: the aphorist or his Kripke figure. 
The art of antiphilosophical unaccountability is eloquently evoked in Human. 
Nietzsche, further speaking on the merits of incompleteness, explains that the aim of a eulogy 
“requires precisely an enticing incompleteness as an irrational element which presents to the 
hearer’s imagination the illusion of a dazzling sea which obscures the coast on the other side, 
that is to say the limitations of the object to be eulogized, as though in a fog” (§199). On the 
other hand, a “complete” eulogy of someone “gives rise to the suspicions that these are his 
only merits.” Though this aphorism was perhaps voiced in an aesthetic register, it begs to be 
turned around at pointed at our often-cryptic aphorists. Were we to call upon Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein to complete their remarks we might be very disappointed with the limitations 
that emerge. While perhaps we did not misunderstand the small initial remark, the 
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completion of the remark might not go as far as we want it to go (as Wittgenstein says in his 
first remark on Augustine and apples, “explanations come to an end somewhere”). The “fog” 
over certain famous remarks is perhaps not only an uncertainty over what they meant, but 
actually an optimism that the philosopher could have gone further with the thought in 
question – and for each interpreter, that they could have gone further in precisely the 
direction his or her reading is headed. While aphorisms are often held to be a brief flash of 
insight – a contribution of wisdom – in this sense the greatest aphorisms are those that entice 
us with their incompletion, and are hence a kind of deliberate withholding.  
The act of withholding is a powerful force in both philosophers and in the respective 
presentations of their philosophies. Following Badiou’s invitation, this force could certainly 
be polemically framed as anti-philosophical: at this juncture, it suffices to say it is something 
they share. This assessment of withholding is initially beckoned by Wittgenstein’s most 
famous aphorism: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (Tractatus  7). 
Compare this great aphorism to its vastly more obscure, but distinctively Nietzschean 
predecessor: “One should speak only when one may not stay silent; and then only of that 
which one has overcome – everything else is chatter, ‘literature’, lack of breeding” (Preface, 
§1, II1). While much has been written on Wittgenstein’s silence, his “quietism,” Nietzsche 
advances an underappreciated art of withholding, which could be taken in an either 
philosophical or literary vein. In Human he withholds masterfully, espousing the merits of an 
incomplete presentation while simultaneously adhering to his mantra, sending out frequent 
volleys of ultra-short remarks, the best of which beg to be fleshed out. Nietzsche aphorizes 
concisely: “When his work opens its mouth, the author has to shut his” (§188, II1) -- in itself 
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a statement that merits elaboration. In this aphorism, entitled Shutting his mouth, he achieves 
exactly that. Yet beyond the philosophical or creative necessity of withholding for Nietzsche, 
laying out one’s thoughts excessively is simply poor style, poor writing. In Thinkers as 
stylists, he aphorizes that “Most thinkers write badly because they communicate to us not 
only their thoughts but also the thinking of their thoughts” (§188, I). The source book of this 
aphorism plainly and readily adheres to its aesthetic. Such a claim is also a good way of 
differentiating the style of the Tractatus from the Investigations. 
While it can be suggested that the Tractatus somehow withholds its “thinking” while 
the Investigations lays out its thinking in a verbose and pedagogical manner rife with 
grammatical examples, it is not clear in the first place what this distinction means between 
thoughts and the thinking of thoughts. Is it even possible to withhold the thinking of our 
thoughts? What is this “thinking” that manifests itself in philosophical writing: the thought-
presentation or the thought-development over time? Interpreting this aphorism as 
recommending a kind of highly refined, condensed, minimalistic presentation, then certainly 
the early Wittgenstein was a not a bad writer at all in Nietzsche’s aesthetic. And in the sense 
that thinking in a text is the writer’s process of developing thoughts over time that leaves 
self-evident historical traces in the work, then the Tractatus is a work stripped of its thinking, 
due to Wittgenstein’s insistence on removing the notes and eschewing a biographical 
introduction.  
However, we do not need to fix a single meaning to Thinkers as stylists to make two 
general and salient points on their writing. Firstly the espoused aesthetics and stylistics of 
withholding found in Human, All Too Human evidently reflect its own writing. Secondly 
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Wittgenstein – who held Nietzsche to be the greatest author among the philosophers and who 
possibly adapted Nietzsche’s aphorism on silence into the last and most famous proposition 
of the Tractatus  – was an equally masterful withholder. While after the Tractatus he 
progresses towards a more thorough and verbose presentation in the Investigations, in the 
next chapter we will see him reanimate his art of withholding in the Investigations as he 
eschews the very constituents of conventional philosophy: theses, theories, and explanations.   
In conclusion to this chapter, we can attempt to sum up the interpretive contrast 
between Human and the Investigations by reflecting on some generally held wisdom about 
the aphorism. In her synoptic article “Nietzsche and the Art of the Aphorism,” Jill Marsden 
states that in general “Aphorisms are essentially modular assertions which function 
independently of narrativity” (27). We have seen this to be largely true in Human, but 
because of the continuities and family resemblances we have identified in the remarks of the 
Investigations, either this statement fails to hold or this work is not truly a book of aphorisms. 
Marsden also states that across Nietzsche’s works, “for the most part, the context of the 
aphorism is no broader than its terms” (27). This is true semantically and grammatically of 
Human. On the interpretive level, however, the interpretive context – the texts or concepts 
that we attempt to relate to the work – can be rather immense. This potential set includes 
philosophical and cultural history, the texts Nietzsche read, and Nietzsche’s own texts. Yet 
depending on our interpretive aims, we could conceivably heed Nietzsche’s belief in The 
effectiveness of the incomplete and essentially invent a context that his aphorisms inspire. In 
academic or philosophical writing, we can generally attempt to distinguish between “using” a 
quote – deploying it for some aim – and “interpreting” a quote – explaining what it might 
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mean. However, both Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s frustrate this distinction to the practical 
extent that trying to “use” their remarks constitutes an interpretation: perhaps one of many 
possible “completions” of the “incomplete”. 
Admittedly, our discussion does not always make such a distinction in its own 
quotation of their texts. In this chapter, to enrich the interpretive context of their remarks we 
generally look to Human’s historical network of references and to the Investigations’ own 
pedagogical method.  Yet these are not the only options. Another approach, for instance, 
would entail putting the Investigations into dialogue with Wittgenstein’s Brown Book or 
Philosophical Grammar, noting how his examples remained intact or were transmuted as 
they passed to the Investigations. There is certainly expository and interpretive value in this. 
However, the strategy taken in this chapter attempts to extract interpretive frameworks from 
the two primary books’ own logic that is allegedly proper to them: a logic thoroughly 
historicized and externally referenced Nietzsche, and textually internal and pedagogically 
astute for Wittgenstein. While we have not delved much into their biographies, it is certainly 
fitting to mention that these two logics coincide rather naturally with two of their famed 
careers: Nietzsche the philologist and Wittgenstein the elementary school teacher.  
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Chapter 4: The Reasons for Raisins: The Necessity of Stückwerk 
Philosophy 
 
Despite Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s major associations with the forms of 
aphorisms (Human), propositions (the Tractatus), or remarks (the Investigations) – 
essentially, with small philosophical pieces – both acknowledged the limitations of 
philosophy as written in pieces. In the well-known preface to the Investigations which was 
written in 1945, Wittgenstein mentions the failure of his thoughts to “proceed from one 
subject to another in a natural order without breaks” and to follow a “single direction.” He 
professes his inability to unite his thoughts into a conventional philosophical whole in this 
work. Yet in a more obscure remark from 1948, Wittgenstein articulates a general expression 
of what we could call his problem of raisins, a problem that will emerge in this chapter in 
both philosophers’ texts: 
Raisins may be the best part of a cake; but a bag full of raisins is no better than a 
cake; and he who is in a position to give us a bag full of raisins, cannot necessarily 
bake a cake with them, let alone do something better. 
I am thinking of Krauss & his aphorisms, but of myself too & my philosophical 
remarks. 
A cake is not, as it were, thinned out raisins. (qtd. in Perloff 724) 
While raisins represent (discrete) remarks in this baking metaphor, it is less clear to what the 
cake corresponds. Certainly something like “a (whole) philosophy,”  “a (holistic) 
philosophical method,” or “a philosophical system” could stand in for “a cake.” Or perhaps, 
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on a more textual level, he is concerned with the relation between the parts and whole of a 
piece of writing. So we could read this metaphor as: “Wise, quotable sayings may be the best 
part of a work; but a collection of such sayings is no better than a unified work; and he who 
is in a position to give us a collection of sayings cannot necessarily form a unified work with 
them, let alone do something better.” 
 This metaphor has at least two conceivable interpretations for piecewise works, one 
more philosophical and the other more textual and literary. Yet as we will see in this chapter 
in both Human and the Investigations, such interpretations are deeply and often inextricably 
linked together when we evaluate the philosophical necessity of Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s “raisins”. We will see Nietzsche strain under the tension of critiquing the 
“cakes” of systematic and metaphysical philosophy while simultaneously yearning for his 
thought to constitute its own kind of philosophical whole. He seeks a unity on a deeper level 
than that of his allegedly fragmented aphorisms. We will then take a close look at 
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical remarks, particularly §§126-128, to see how his style of 
writing aligns with his anti-dogmatism and grammatical methods.  
 An intuitive question about Wittgenstein’s practice of philosophy emerges from the 
cake metaphor and the preface to the Investigations. Why can’t Wittgenstein bake himself a 
cake, that is, a kind of philosophical or textual whole? Is the failure simply due to poor 
technique, a problem that could be eliminated with sufficient practice, or is the barrier an 
ineradicably philosophical one? Given unlimited resources – such as a (truly rare) disciple 
who understood his work to his liking – could Wittgenstein have reformulated the 
Investigations into a unified work, or would this revision inherently undermine his 
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philosophical project? In his preface, we find a preliminary clue to suspect this is a 
philosophical problem, in addition to whatever potential biographical or aesthetic aspects it 
may have. Wittgenstein tantalizingly suggests that his failure to “weld [his] results together 
into such a whole” – i.e. a book whose thoughts “proceed one from subject to another in a 
natural order and without breaks” – is “connected to the very nature of the investigation”. 
That is to say, perhaps, the form of writing is fundamentally connected with the philosophical 
content. Yet this connection, if it exists, is likely a less obvious and less studied linkage when 
compared to Nietzsche’s philosophy and its relation to his writings. Thus we will begin with 
Human after a general observation about the necessity involved in such connections. 
These connections, whether in Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, or other philosophers, suggest 
an essential question when we concern ourselves with philosophical style -- or more 
accurately the stylistics of a specific philosophical text. It is a question of the form: does the 
style of writing align with the content? This alignment connotes a mirroring, correspondence, 
reflection, or symbiosis of the two levels.  If the answer is yes, and it is indeed yes for a great 
many commentators on the Tractatus, the Investigations, and Nietzsche’s aphorism books, 
then it can be followed by a more difficult and divisive question: is the style philosophically 
necessary to deliver the content? We will see that “philosophically necessary” is a tricky 
term: this might merely mean that an unsuitable style might “undermine” or “go against” the 
content, or in a more extreme view, renders the text effectively meaningless or entails 
rejecting the conclusions it reaches. The extreme view amounts to throwing out, for instance, 
a systematically-written Human, All Too Human. The perspective of this chapter is somewhat 
more moderate: Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s chosen form of philosophy-in-pieces is 
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necessary in that we could fairly accuse them of hypocrisy had they reformulated certain key 
ideas about philosophy into a highly coherent textual form. While reformulated versions of 
these texts would certainly be worth reading, they would be disfigured by a divergence 
between what is shown versus said. In other words, this chapter holds our aphorists 
accountable to practicing what they preach -- to the unity of application with espousal. 
4.1 Nietzsche’s Anti-Systematic Aphorisms and his Taste for Cake 
 
What is likely the most general and fundamental alignment between style and content 
that Nietzsche’s readers have identified is as follows. Nietzsche distrusts (philosophical and 
metaphysical) systems in his content; his manner of writing, and particularly his aphorisms, 
are unsystematic in his style. This generalization regarding this alignment, built around 
unsystematicity, is fairly uncontroversial (particularly in the wake of his poststructuralist 
readers). Yet the strength of the alignment, and the question of its necessity, varies 
immensely.  At the very least, his unsystematic style can be regarded as a successful 
ornamentation of his distrust of systems; taking a stronger view, Nietzsche would utterly 
undermine his anti-systematic message had he delivered the content of his aphorisms in 
systematic manner.       
 However, we cannot yet evaluate this alignment faithfully until we have a clear view 
of what Nietzsche and his readers mean by systems – a rather multifaceted term. We should 
note that Nietzsche was an anti-systematic thinker in senses beyond the purely philosophical 
one, since he certainly attacks entities such as religious systems, but we will not have 
opportunity to consider them here. Moving to its philosophical use, let us keep in mind that 
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the word “system” is often used to describe manifold entities, inviting at least three aspects of 
philosophical systematicity that Nietzsche could conceivably reject: (1) the structural, 
arranged, and taxonomical (2) the complete, totalizing, and whole (3) the functional and 
methodological. So it is not clear in merely labeling him as anti-systematic whether his 
objection is to architectonic systematicity in the Kantian sense or a different kind of holistic, 
perhaps more textual systematicity. Thus we will first turn to history. 
Beyond the uses of the word “system,” in understanding Human as anti-systematic 
there should also be a historical conception, whether specific or general, of a systematic 
philosophical work. In his chapter on metaphysics Nietzsche readily reminds us of the need 
for “historical philosophizing” (§276, I). For Nietzsche, the obvious model is the formidable 
German tradition of systematic philosophical writing which preceded him. A summary such 
as this one provides the backdrop of idealism: 
The ideological consequence of such a [non-systematic] form [of aphorisms] must, I 
believe, been attractive to Nietzsche, for an ostensibly casual collection of truths 
corresponds exactly to Nietzsche’s philosophical position at this time [of Human]. 
His idealistic predecessors in philosophy had conceived the search for truth as the 
construction of a system for explaining the world. One cannot turn to any page in 
Kant or Hegel and expect to find a self-sufficient thought, for all is conceived as a 
great, interdependent system. (Faber 208) 
Similarly, Erich Heller’s introduction to the Hollingdale translation to the work situates 
Nietzsche’s form of writing against a German backdrop, claiming that “Nietzsche was too 
intelligent and too much of a latecomer in the history of German philosophy, a history both 
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glorious and disastrous, to build a system in the manner of their misguidedly fondest 
ambition” (xvii). In this understanding, Nietzsche did not turn against systematic philosophy 
in himself so as much as witness the movement run its course from his somewhat historically 
removed vantage.  Nietzsche was in a radically different position than Wittgenstein, who 
wrote a first work that in his own words “is quite strictly speaking the presentation of a 
system” (qtd. in Monk 177). Wittgenstein’s system was one that he later dismantles in the 
Investigations – extensively in form, and to a controversial degree in content. We will 
eventually see Nietzsche ruthlessly attack the character of the systematizer and of systematic 
belief:  already a conceivable and non-hypocritical option since he never produced a great 
systematic work like Kant or Wittgenstein.  
Let us prime ourselves with one of the most familiar examples of philosophical 
systematicity, drawn from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. There is no reason here to argue 
that this is Nietzsche’s specific model of systematic philosophical writing nor the exact sort 
philosophical system he attacks in Human. Indeed we will see that Nietzsche does not engage 
systems such as Kant’s on their own internal terms. That said, there is evidence suggesting 
Nietzsche read the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment some years before 
writing Human, and he is known to have closely read the Critique of Practical Reason some 
years after; across Nietzsche’s texts, Kant is the second most mentioned modern philosopher 
after Schopenhauer (Hill 20).  Here are two particularly system-friendly passages from the 




Transcendental philosophy is only the idea of a science, for which the critique of pure 
reason should trace an outline architectonically, i.e. from principles, thereby 
guaranteeing the completeness and reliability of all the parts of which this edifice 
consists. It is a system of all principles of pure reason. (54, Introduction, VII) 
 
By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As systematic unity 
is what first raises common knowledge to the dignity of a science, that is, turns a 
mere aggregate of knowledge into a system, it is easy to see that architectonic is the 
doctrine of what is scientific in our knowledge (652, II, Chapter 3, “The Architectonic 
of Pure Reason”) 
These passages exemplify the usual aspects of philosophical systematicity mentioned earlier: 
strivings toward structure, unity, and method.  However, as we will soon see, Nietzsche does 
not pick a conventionally fair fight with philosophical systems that engages these aspects 
head-on. 
Nietzsche makes one attack on precisely “philosophical systems” in Human; the rest 
of his anti-systematic bent needs to be inferred from his aphorisms on metaphysics and 
various social and religious “systems” which may not use the term as such. His explicit uses 
of “system” are often ordinary, such as “voting-system” [Stimmsystem] (§276, II2), and 
“system [System] of all that which humanity has need of for its continued existence” (§186, 
II1). Yet when placed behind “philosophical,” the word takes on an unusual sense: 
31. In the desert of science. – To the man of science on his unassuming and laborious 
travels, which must often enough be journeys through the desert, there appear those 
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glittering mirages called ‘philosophical systems’ [philosophische Systeme]: with 
bewitching, deceptive power they show the solution of all enigmas and the freshest 
draught of the true water of life to be near at hand; ... (§31, II1) 
Nietzsche continues this aphorism by claiming that other sorts of people, beyond just the 
scientific man, may eventually reject these mirages of philosophical systems. These 
“apparitions,” as he calls them, leave a salty taste in the mouth, summoning a “raging thirst” 
without bringing us any closer to water. In this desert metaphor the philosophical system, 
more than being any particular kind of structural or methodological whole like Kant’s, is 
rendered as a “solution,” a deceptive quenching of the thirst for truth.  
Curiously, this aphorism’s sense of philosophical solution is closer to the Tractatus 
than to the quoted passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. Wittgenstein’s preface to the 
Tractatus states “the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to be unassailable and 
definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems [of philosophy] have in essentials 
been finally solved.” Though the Tractatus is widely regarded as a systematic work – at the 
very least, in its structure – the sense of “philosophical system” that irritates Nietzsche in this 
aphorism is solutional rather than structural. Thus regardless how the “aphoristic” 
arrangements of the Tractatus and Human compare, it appears that what Nietzsche would 
have most disliked about the Tractatus  is its confidence that it has figured out the enigmas of 
philosophy (though to be fair to Wittgenstein,  the Tractatus shows “how little has been done 
when these problems have been solved”). While Nietzsche was familiar with German 
idealism and not the Tractatus, in turning to his distinctive manner of writing we will see an 
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anti-systematic ethos in Nietzsche that transcends the specifics of the philosophical systems 
in question.   
Nietzsche’s chosen form of aphorisms in Human cultivates an ethos that is fitting for 
an anti-systematic and anti-metaphysical philosopher. Why should he persuade us if he 
systematically explained the flaws of philosophical systems?  Or if he methodically outlined, 
in the formal manner of metaphysical explanations, what is wrong with metaphysics?  There 
would certainly be a rhetorical conflict, and arguably a philosophical conflict, between what 
is practiced and what is preached. Nietzsche was in fact a specialist in ancient rhetoric, 
remarkably expert in the field and adept in its application when compared to most 
philosophers (and particularly Kant, who has received scant praise as a philosophical stylist). 
Some years before starting Human he produced lecture notes on rhetoric, which have been 
dated to 1872 or 1874 (Blair 94).On account of his rhetorical study and his palpable 
eloquence across his works, Nietzsche has invited a number of rhetorical readings (while 
Paul de Man’s is likely the most famous, Paul van Tongeren’s is more classically and 
aphoristically astute). It suffices to say that Nietzsche was familiar with rhetoric’s finer, more 
philological points, and he certainly knew his basics well. To illuminate the claim of his anti-
systematic ethos, his own explanation of the term is quite fitting: 
The true orator speaks forth from the ethos of the persons or things represented  by 
him ... The listener will believe  in the earnestness  of  the  speaker  and the truth of 
the thing advocated  only if the  speaker  and  his language  are  adequately  suited  to  
one another: he takes  a lively interest  in the speaker  and believes  in him -- that  is,  
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that the  speaker  himself  believes  in the thing,  and thus is sincere. ("Lecture Notes 
on Rhetoric" 114) 
Simply put, Nietzsche’s style in Human is necessary for him to be sincere in his attack on 
philosophical and metaphysical systems. A later aphorism from Twilight of the Idols 
reiterates that his issue with philosophical systems is not intrinsic to them so much as about 
the character of the systematiser: 
26. I distrust all systematisers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of 
integrity. 
Instead of attacking systems based on their internal flaws – i.e. on the internal terms of a 
work such as the Critique of Pure Reason -- we observe that Nietzsche seeks out their 
weaknesses in production (through a lack of integrity) and their reception (as illusory water 
in the desert). Instead of the several architectonic aspects of systematicity he could have 
evoked, here again he seeks the human (all too human) flaws of systematicity. To be fair to 
Kant and his fellow systematisers, we should remember that this aphorism – drawn from a 
section called “Arrows and Epigrams” – is a classic ad hominem attack, and not even a 
particularly ingenious one by Nietzschean standards. It clearly runs contrary to the standard 
argumentative practices of modern philosophy, practices that we will eventually see both 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein defy in dramatic but distinctive manner. However, we should 
already note this preliminary (rhetorical) success in reframing the error of systematic 
thought, in the message and form of his aphorisms, to be one of character. 
Nietzsche’s anti-systematic strategies are particularly evident in his aphorisms 
concerning metaphysical systems. Though many aphorisms of Human touch on moralistic, 
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religious, and artistic topics that have manifestly little to do with traditional philosophy (or 
the main themes of Investigations), the most interesting philosophical aphorisms of Human 
are about metaphysics. In the first and most metaphysical chapter of Human entitled “Of 
First and Last Things” Nietzsche wonders, in the context of Kant and Schopenhauer: 
“Perhaps the scientific demonstration of the existence of any kind of metaphysical world is 
already so difficult that mankind will never again be free of a mistrust of it. And if one has a 
mistrust of metaphysics the results are by and large the same as if it had been directly refuted 
and one no longer had the right to believe in it.” (§21, I). In this aphorism, as with the other 
anti-systematic attacks we have already seen, Nietzsche operates with the language of 
skepticism and human mistrust rather than attempting to destroy systems on their own 
philosophical or architectonic terms (that is, from within). Etymologically speaking, he turns 
metaphysical truth from un-concealment (a-letheia) of the world to a matter of truth as trust  
and verification (veritas) of fallible human philosophers.  Nietzsche’s attack on metaphysics 
is so often expressed through human attributes: 
All that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions valuable, terrible, delightful to 
[people], all that has begotten these assumptions, is passion, error, and self-deception. 
... When one has disclosed these methods as the foundation of all extant religions and 
metaphysical systems, one has refuted them!” (§9, I). 
Marion Faber, another one of Human’s translators, also detects Nietzsche’s allegations of 
dishonesty against metaphysical philosophy and his consequent textual strategies against it. 
In particular, she relates Nietzsche’s anti-systematic form to distrust of metaphysical systems 
as represented by Schopenhauer, who Nietzsche turned against in the period encompassing 
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the first volume of Human (208).  She states “the unsystematic form of the aphoristic work is 
perhaps the only one truly able to reflect this anti-systematic ideology of the Nietzsche of 
1876. For him, it must have seemed the only honest form of philosophy” (208). The notion of 
his aphorisms as an “honest form of philosophy” is an apt phrase for our discussion, fitting 
well with his ethos outlined earlier.  
The obvious point should be made that while honest for Nietzsche, his form is 
radically dishonest if one holds that philosophy be practiced with classic arguments that 
avoid fallacious reasoning. It has been noted that Nietzsche’s (overall) critique of 
metaphysics is not conducted with the usual argumentation of traditional critical philosophy, 
but with “pragmatic and demagogical value-oppositions [such] as weakness and strength, 
disease and health, herd and ‘the happy few,’ terms so arbitrarily valorized that it becomes 
hard to take them seriously” (de Man 119). While the present task concerns his critique of 
metaphysics with respect to his writing more than classic ideals of philosophical argument, 
we can observe certain quasi-political moves to discredit his opponents in what he terms this 
“melancholy-valiant” book (Preface §2). Metaphysicians, according to Nietzsche, keep a 
“knapsack” of embarrassing byproducts of metaphysics “concealed behind their back” (§12, 
II1). Our great philosophical showman eagerly tugs this knapsack open without resorting to 
real critical argument, appearing hopeful that his revelation of the metaphysicians might be 
“attended by their blushes” (§12, II1). 
 Nietzsche’s contempt for the human error of metaphysics becomes less surprising in 
light of his preoccupation with psychology that weaves its way throughout the chapters.  He 
states: “That reflection on the human, all too human – or, as the learned expression has it: 
 
 65 
psychological observation – is among the expedients by means of which one can ... pluck 
useful maxims from the thorniest and most disagreeable stretches of one’s own life” (§35,I). 
In the midst of his own grave physical and mental ills, Nietzsche turned to aphorisms as an 
“honest form” for decrying the psychological beliefs in (and of) metaphysicians and 
systematisers.  One can certainly depict Nietzsche’s human reframing of metaphysical 
systems as flagrantly evading, say, a proper anti-architectonic argument. However, defeating 
Nietzsche’s art of textualizing and rhetoricizing his philosophy on its own terms – an art that 
sinks its tendrils deep into his aphoristic form –is a far more formidable challenge.    
Though Nietzsche’s distaste for philosophical systems is manifest in his writing, we 
should not go too far and construe this distaste to also include all sorts of philosophical 
“cakes.” Thus far we have moved towards disunity with Nietzsche, but we ought to also 
assess a curious holistic tendency in how he seeks to be read.  In typical discussions of the 
difficulties of Nietzsche’s writing we find claims such as this: “There is not a single respect 
in which Nietzsche’s thought forms a sound system, for it is too aphoristic, fragmentary and 
contradictory” (Ijselling 104). It is not our cause here to refute this claim; doing so in a 
satisfying way would likely involve sketching out some kind of system for his thought. 
However, we should remember that Nietzsche at least believes, on certain occasions, that his 
work is not deeply fragmentary. We will see this directly in Human and in the preface to On 
The Genealogy of Morals, where he reflects back on his first book of aphorisms. Nietzsche 
asks us in a typical translation from Human:  
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Against the shortsighted. – Do you think this work must be fragmentary [Stückwerk] 
because I give it to you (and have to give it to you) in fragments [Stücken]?  (§128, 
II1) 
This aphorism’s question seemingly begs to be answered negatively by prompting the reader 
to posit a deeper way which the work is not “fragmentary,” despite being presented as textual 
“fragments.”  In this statement we should caution ourselves about the terms we use -- and 
Nietzsche’s terms -- for his writing. The usual translation of “Stückwerk” into “fragmentary” 
evokes a brokenness and shatteredness that is not ideal and that Nietzsche himself, as we 
shall soon see, does not consider to be characteristic of his thought in Human and its 
subsequent development.  Translating more directly we should consider Stück-werk to be 
piece-work, patch-work, a work of pieces/parts: a way of emphasizing that his work, though 
made up of components, exists as intended and was not broken into fragments as if fallen 
from its higher form and smashed into lowly shards. 
Long after writing Human, Nietzsche reflects upon this particular book of aphorisms 
with a remarkably holistic attitude for a putatively “fragmentary” philosopher. These 
reflections should be considered against Derrida’s looming warnings over Nietzsche’s 
umbrella: that he lacks “not even a fragmentary or aphoristic” sort of totality (Derrida 135). 
In the preface to On The Genealogy of Morals (1887) Nietzsche gives an incredibly 
optimistic sketch of how his “ideas on the origin of our moral prejudices,” first expressed in 
the aphorisms of Human, underwent a process of cohesion, having “entwined and interlaced” 
over the years.  He then expresses a belief in unity which is difficult, but not quite 
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impossible, to reconcile with the fragmentary Nietzsche that many scholars recognize. 
Nietzsche proclaims his: 
joyful assurance that they [these thoughts on morals first expressed in Human] might 
have arisen in me from the first not as isolated, capricious, or sporadic things but 
from a common root, from a fundamental will of knowledge, pointing imperiously 
into the depths, speaking more and more precisely, demanding greater and greater 
precision. For this alone is fitting for a philosopher. We have no right to isolated acts 
of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. 
Nietzsche’s strategy here is to exchange his thoughts’ manifestly fragmentary presentation 
for a deep unity. Though he could propose different forms of unity, of a “common root,” 
such an exchange between surface and depth is essentially his only strategy, lest he 
contradict himself in the obvious manner as a prolific writer of manifestly “isolated, 
capricious, or sporadic” aphorisms. 
Explicit here in this passage, and implicit in his aphorism asking whether Human is 
fragmentary, is his desire to be understood coherently despite the appearance of his work.  
These two unity-seeking statements are interesting to ally with the central figure of the book, 
the free-spirit, who has “truth on his side, or at least the spirit of inquiry after truth” (§225, I). 
In this alliance we should express caution with the most popular Nietzsche: the fragmentary 
and the truth-distrusting Nietzsche. Though for many commentators, his aphoristic form, 
many styles of writing, and enormously influential unpublished essay “On Truth and Lies” 
advance a multifarious philosophical mosaic – perpetually eschewing unities and 
monumental truths – Nietzsche (a certain Nietzsche) at least asks us piece him back together 
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on occasion. In this passage, it appears that Nietzsche wishes to be unified around a highly 
perspicuous “fundamental will for knowledge”. While attempting to read this unity in 
Nietzsche is too vast a topic for this discussion, we can turn to his some of his major 
interpreters to see how they heeded or ignored Nietzsche’s curious and possibly hypocritical 
call to unity. 
While many of his poststructuralist readers embraced the fragmentary Nietzsche, 
Heidegger’s earlier, highly influential interpretation reflects the thrust of conceptual 
unification espoused in the passage from On The Genealogy of Morals. Heidegger indeed 
bound Nietzsche’s philosophy into a limited number of concepts (the eternal recurrence, the 
will to power, and so on) while suppressing the many formal variations of his writings (such 
as the aphorism book), ultimately resulting in a single Nietzsche doctrine (Stegmaier 10).  
Though in works such as Human Nietzsche attacks both metaphysics and systematic 
philosophy, Heidegger renders Nietzsche’s overall attempted overcoming of metaphysics as 
systematic and doctrinal. Paradoxically, according to Heidegger, “Nietzsche’s doctrine does 
not overcome metaphysics: it is the uttermost unseeing adoption of the very guiding project 
of metaphysics” (qtd. in Stegmaier 10). In this manner, Heidegger’s interpretation fulfils (yet 
perverts) Nietzsche’s wish for a “common root” to his thought. While evaluating the success 
of Heidegger’s cohesion of Nietzsche is beyond our scope, Heidegger’s Nietzsche 
interpretation certainly raises spectres of Nietzsche’s latent systematicity: who are the greater 
systematisers, the philosophers or their interpreters? 
Moving to Nietzsche’s major French interpreters who were associated with 
poststructuralism, we are confronted with a sizable reading list. The list becomes truly vast 
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when Nietzsche is filtered through the existing body of French Theory, and certain traditions 
of literary theory that have become attached to it. Though impossible to synopsize, we can 
turn to Deleuze for a somewhat representative French interpretation of Nietzsche’s textual-
philosophical interrelations. Given the interpretive challenges that we have already seen 
aphorisms pose, and considering the general poststructuralist enthusiasm for pluralism and 
hermeneutics, Deleuze’s treatment of the aphorism is fairly unsurprising:  
The poem and the aphorism are Nietzsche’s two most vivid means of expression but 
they have a determinate relation to philosophy. Understood formally, an aphorism is 
present as a fragment; it is the form of pluralist thought; in its content it claims to 
articulate and formulate a sense. The sense of a being, an action, a thing – these are 
the objects of the aphorism. ... Only the aphorism is capable of articulating sense, the 
aphorism is interpretation and the art of interpreting. (Nietzsche and Philosophy 31)  
In A Thousand Plateaus – itself a work deeply concerned with philosophical and 
epistemological structures – Deleuze pursues this fragmentary tendency (in himself, and in 
Nietzsche). He claims:  “Nietzsche’s aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only to 
invoke the cyclical unity of the Eternal return” (6). Though a grandiose statement to be sure, 
this sentence embodies the two forces under tension we have already seen in Nietzsche: the 
first pushing towards anti-systematic fragmentation, the second pulling towards a deep unity 
of his thought.  
 Beyond Deleuze’s own interpretation of Nietzsche’s aphorisms, his thought is readily 
applied retroactively. For instance, there is a Deleuzian characterization of Nietzsche’s 
aphorism books as a form of “nomadic philosophy,”  a mobile, pluralistic army and a kind of 
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antithesis to “imperial philosophy” which insists on “first principles, generalizable method, 
and systematic form” (Shapiro, “Nietzschean Aphorism” 427). We might also make a 
distinction between Nietzsche’s rhizomatic, pluralistic Human and, for instance, Kant’s 
arborescent, systematic Critique of Pure Reason (or the Tractatus, which is more literally a 
textual tree of seven branches, organized around its decimal numbering system). 
Though we cannot do justice to all of Nietzsche’s French interpreters or even 
Deleuze, these examples do a fair job of representing how Nietzsche’s aphorisms have 
become associated with fragmentary thought and interpretive pluralism. With the hindsight 
afforded by several decades’ distance from the birth of the French Nietzsche and the height 
of French Theory, it should not be too surprising that Nietzsche’s aphoristic writing 
dovetailed with the textualizing and hyper-interpretive forces of this movement. Yet we 
should recognize that beyond the specifics of a Nietzschean aphorism’s own cornucopian 
interpretative possibility, the entire role of his aphorisms is readily interpretable and 
adaptable to large-scale trends in 20
th
-century intellectual history. While the present concern 
is the means and ends of the aphorism in Human, we should note that the discourse on 
Nietzsche’s overall aphoristic expression is rife with statements where his collective 
aphorisms are doing something philosophical – participating in a gigantic undertaking such 
as “shattering the linear unity of knowledge”. 
 Summarizing what we have seen of Nietzsche’s form-content relations, we should 
note three major points. Firstly, his Stückwerk form of writing in Human, All Too Human, 
and the ethos it cultivates, are consistent with his anti-metaphysical and anti-systematic 
messages. Nietzsche does not trust systematisers, and we as readers should at least trust him 
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to the extent that he successfully avoids systematic writing. His strategy is largely external to 
the systems: he does not duel with systems such as Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s from within 
their frameworks; instead, he elects to frame the human errors of their creators and beholders. 
Secondly, as an essential and often neglected companion to this anti-systematic point, 
Nietzsche asks us to stop short of taking the fragmentary reading as far down as it will go. He 
claims that we must (somehow) avoid “isolated truths.” That is to say, while his “raisins” 
counteract systematic philosophical writing, he still has a taste for some kind of philosophical 
“cake”. Thirdly and finally, the big old scene of Nietzsche interpretation offers ways of both 
unifying and forcing apart his philosophical pieces. As mentioned in the introduction, this 
discussion is more concerned with the problems and possibility of interpretation more than 
persuasive or synoptic interpretations of philosophical texts. Thus we are not in a position to 
effectively assess whether Nietzsche’s pieces can be unified. However, we now have reason 
to believe that, at least in Human, his writing is essential to his philosophizing.  
4.2 Wittgenstein’s Art of Reminders 
 
 Having presented Nietzsche’s anti-systematic alignment of form and content along 
with his curious desire to still be read coherently, we will look for corresponding alignments 
in the Investigations between its form of remarks and anti-traditional content. With 
Nietzsche’s anti-systematic attacks still in mind, we might be inclined to look for an anti-
systematic Wittgenstein.  While feasible, we should perhaps avoid the term systematic as 
such: this would require deftly severing the later Wittgenstein from the early Wittgenstein, 
lest any residual systematicity from the Tractatus creep into the Investigations. A better 
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parallel for the anti-systematic Nietzsche in Human in terms of form and content would be 
the anti-dogmatic Wittgenstein in Investigations. We will locate him in §§126-128 and take a 
close look at this famous sequence of remarks that arguably encapsulates a certain big picture 
of philosophy. Badiou, though more interested in the Tractatus than the Investigations, 
would likely take issue with the Wittgensteinian vision that will soon ensue, since it conveys 
an anti-philosophical “unraveling of the pretentions of philosophy to constitute itself as a 
theory” (emphasis added, 75). It will become readily apparent that Wittgenstein distrusts 
precisely what is theoretical – new, explanatory, deductive, thetical – about philosophy. 
Termed more respectfully, Wittgenstein’s “metaphilosophical” sequence §§126-128 
is frequently quoted and interrogated to understand both his general philosophical views and 
his specific aims in this work. Yet in our particular pursuit of the possible necessity of his 
textual form, this sequence of remarks takes on a new significance: 
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything.— Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is 
hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. 
 One might also give the name “philosophy” to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions. 
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular 
purpose. [Die Arbiet des Philosophen ist ein Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu 
einem bestimmeten Zweck.] 
128. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate 
them, because everyone would agree to them. 
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Let us begin with §127, which will be our main focus point for examining the form of 
Investigations. Eventually we will examine how “assembling reminders” coincides with 
assembling remarks. Yet firstly we can notice the apparent radicalism of the statement in 
itself. When §127  is isolated from the text and considered against the historical backdrop of 
philosophy –modern, ancient, continental, or otherwise – both words of “assembling 
reminders” appear strikingly odd choices. Surely the work of a typical philosopher is, prima 
facie, along the lines of “discovering theories” or “finding explanations”. However, 
considered with its surrounding remarks §126 and §128, and the later Wittgenstein’s general 
anti-theoretical bent, the pairing becomes quite intelligible. Given that Wittgenstein’s true 
philosopher could not advance things like theories, explanations, and theses (§109, §126, and 
§128), something more ordinary and perhaps everyday is required: “reminder” is one of the 
least philosophical terms, in a traditional sense,  that could stand in for a product of 
philosophical inquiry. 
 Since Wittgenstein believes philosophy to be “what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions” (§126), it is indeed fitting he used “assembling” 
[Zusammentragen] in place of a word such as creating that invokes newness. 
Zusammentragen does not necessarily involve new things; similar terms – collating, 
compiling, collecting, amassing, gathering, rounding up, and bringing together – do not 
conjure something new like inventing, innovating, discovering, creating, and conceiving. 
Appropriately, “reminders” [Erinnerungen] are revisitings of the past (a more typical, out-of-
context translation would be “memories”). A philosopher, conventionally conceived, surely 
lives in the present of his or her ideas more so than a past of already-made things; surely the 
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ideal product of philosophical inquiry is something new. Yet both Zusammentragen and 
Erinnerungen, in their own ways, avoid what is new and what is theoretical. Thus in this 
statement, he counteracts a certain traditional glory that many philosophers are held to 
possess: the greatness of new ideas. His apparently humbly language here, as we will see 
elsewhere, is proper to his anti-dogmatism: what he says about philosophy is largely 
consistent with how he shows it in Investigations. 
In a relatively obscure remark from a 1930 manuscript, Wittgenstein shares a similar 
task to §127: 
“I am so to say collecting [sammle] meaningful sentences about tooth-ache. This is 
the characteristic procedure of a grammatical investigation.” (qtd. in Pichler 222) 
Again we notice Wittgenstein in a process of bringing together (assembling, collecting) 
certain important pieces (reminders, meaningful sentences). Yet in the manuscript he goes so 
far as to call this the “characteristic procedure” of a grammatical investigation: an intriguing 
commentary on his method. And it is his method: this remark is an important supplement to 
§§126-128, because instead of speaking about “philosophy” and “the philosopher” in a 
general way, it is clear here that Wittgenstein himself is doing the collecting. Thus his form 
of writing, as an art of philosophical gathering, becomes essential to his grammatical 
investigation. 
The message of §§126-128 aligns with the overall literary tone of the remarks in the 
Investigations. If we are inclined to label Wittgenstein’s remarks as aphorisms, then having 
witnessed his process of “collecting meaningful sentences” and “assembling reminders” they 
are certainly unusual ones. That he believes he is gathering seemingly pre-existing, somehow 
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ordinary pieces is remarkable in the face of his genre of aphoristic writing. Since aphorists 
are generally thought to produce brief flashes of insight – such as Nietzsche with his 
“brilliance of sudden illuminations” (Heller xvii) – Wittgenstein’s humble gathering becomes 
all the more distinctive. Though obviously an artful and intelligent writer, he is not as witty 
as Nietzsche, nor as witty as the many aphorists who could routinely produce brilliant one-
liners. Yet given the limits to philosophy he seeks to enforce, he should avoid being witty, in 
the sense that wit is a marker of inventive prowess and newness: for Wittgenstein, 
philosophy is “what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions” (§126).   
Just as Nietzsche would be hypocritical to systematically disseminate his anti-
systematic, anti-metaphysical message, Wittgenstein’s philosophical manner would chafe 
against his claims about the possibility of philosophy were he give his remarks the lustrous 
sheen of wit. While brilliant in their perspicuousness, Wittgenstein’s remarks in the 
Investigations generally avoid the same heights of enviable, quotable wit that some of the 
greatest aphorists achieve. This is a good thing as far as his anti-dogmatism is concerned, 
since in comparison to a writer like Nietzsche, he largely the avoids bold, too-quotable 
maxims that are vessels for pithy theses and explanations (Nietzsche’s most famous utterance 
– “God is dead” – is something of a philosophical thesis, but certainly not one that in 
Wittgenstein’s words “everyone would agree to”). 
Beyond the character of his remarks, their plurality and (partial) arrangement is also 
entirely fitting for the metaphilosophy of §§126-128. Wittgenstein’s writing, given §126, 
should have the form of putting “everything before us” – a manner of exhibition – instead of 
explanation or deduction. Indeed it must “do away with all explanation” (§109) . We will see 
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that it does have (something close to) this form. Taking this remark to the extreme, we might 
ask if Wittgenstein precludes himself explaining or deducing anything in the Investigations at 
all. If he wants to eschew explanations his writing should, in a certain philosophical sense, 
avoid the continuity of storytelling. Throughout the Investigations, he of course tells very 
small “stories” of certain dialogues, games, and thought processes. These are really more like 
philosophical scenes, since they are so short and in themselves lacking the criteria to be 
stories (Wittgenstein begins his first remark with a certain Augustinian “picture of the 
essence of human language” -- we cannot do justice here to the special Wittgensteinian term 
“picture”, but we can note its static, discontinuous character).   
Wittgenstein’s scenes when taken together constitute various philosophical projects 
(according to different interpretations, such as the therapeutic one). Yet taken together these 
scenes are surely not a plot, for they are broken apart far too easily: this is by design. 
Wittgenstein claims he demonstrates “a method, by examples; and the series of examples can 
be broken off” (§133). We might say that a conventional story, and a conventional 
explanation, are little good if they are so easily broken off: how do we get from here (now, 
the premises) to there (then, the explanatory conclusion)? Generally speaking a successful 
explanation or story has continuities that fundamentally prevent it from being “broken off” 
since both these forms are arguably constituted by certain logical, causal, and temporal 
linkages. Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s strategy does not react to a single, perhaps central, 
conflict as in a conventional plot: in his approach he believes that “problems are solved 
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem” (§133). His metaphilosophical remarks, and 
the outlining of his method of grammatical examples that can be broken off, are an essential 
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site of correspondence between his message and aphoristic medium. Eschewing conventional 
explanations via the peculiar structures of his remarks, Wittgenstein displays a remarkable 
consistency between his pronouncements about what philosophy should be and the instance 
of his practice. 
This discussion’s own views on the alignment between Wittgenstein’s writing and his 
philosophy in the Investigations can be supplemented with a piece by Stanley Cavell, who 
makes what is likely the boldest argument that Wittgenstein’s writing is essential to his 
philosophizing in his essay “The Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetic of Itself”. He does this 
through what he terms “the aphoristic”: a form of “ordinary words” that satisfies the 
conditions of “completeness, pleasure, and the sense of breaking something off (the chief 
marks of perspicuous representation) – words that epitomize, separate a thought, with finish 
and permanence, from the general range of experience” (28). Then, essentially aligning this 
form of expression with the grammatical “content” of the Investigations, he claims the 
aphoristic is “a mode of reflecting the clarity brought by grammatical methods, one that in 
itself, as itself, exhibits this clarity, together with a satisfaction or acknowledgment of the 
obscurity from which clarity comes” (emphasis added, 29). He adds that in Investigations 
this aphoristic form, rather than inhabiting free-standing aphorisms, is largely targeted at 
“reflecting details of its methodicalness, its searching out criteria, articulating grammar, 
spelling out fantasies, calling attention to a fixated pictured, [and] presenting intermediate 
cases” (29). 
 According to Cavell, the aphoristic in itself and as itself reflects the Investigations’ 
grammatical methods. Though what he calls aphoristic has a specialized, Wittgensteinian 
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meaning, it suffices to say that it amply describes much of Wittgenstein’s literary form in 
Investigations. We might also say that Nietzsche’s own mode of the aphoristic, his particular 
literary form, in itself and as itself reflects Human’s anti-systematic and anti-metaphysical 
project. Though we have seen several aspects of their remarks diverge, they share an 
important philosophical achievement in the aphoristic “sense of breaking something off.” 
They gainfully employ their forms against their respective systematic and dogmatic foes, 
carefully housing their thought in “broken off” pieces so that systematic and dogmatic 
thought cannot fit into their individual structures, nor into the overall structures of their 
books. 
4.3 The Anti-Argumentation of Antiphilosophy 
 
Beyond the structural form of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein’s (philosophically worthy) 
antiphilosophy, one of their shared contrarian dimensions is argumentative.  They are often 
charged with not making classic philosophical arguments. If they are indeed “anti-
philosophers” as Badiou claims, then this is a seemingly natural charge, especially having 
already seen their contempt for standard conceptions of philosophy and its practice. Yet this 
is a fascinating accusation in our context, since we will see that Philosophical Investigations 
and Human, All Too Human effectively eschew argument in two opposite yet complementary 
ways. The books constitute two radically different aberrations from philosophical “best 
practice.” If we accept a basic division between claims and evidence, it can be said that the 
argumentative structure of a typical remark is evidence-without-claim in the Investigations, 
and claim-without-evidence in Human. Or put into different but sufficiently parallel terms, 
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Wittgenstein provides proofs without theses, and Nietzsche theses without proofs. These 
terms of claims, evidence, theses, and proofs have difficult philosophical histories that cannot 
be done full justice here, but they can be employed at face value to evoke a striking (though 
generalized) difference in the way Nietzsche and Wittgenstein argue their cases  -- if they can 
be said to argue in a normative philosophical sense at all. 
This discussion made earlier allegations that Wittgenstein masterfully withholds the 
“completions” of his remarks – but this charge does not even begin to cover all of his 
conceivable omissions from standard philosophical practice. The Investigations, in relative 
and perhaps absolute terms, scarcely tells us what it is doing while it is doing it. According to 
one estimate, the indicative mood is used by less than half of the sentences from Part I 
(Fischer and Ammereller xii). Indeed the Investigations “contains remarkably few sentences 
grammatically suited to express a claim of any kind, premise or conclusion” (Fischer and 
Ammereller xii). Wittgenstein fails to signpost the workings of his thought. Yet the work 
contains plentiful grammatical examples and case-by-case analyses of the use and misuse of 
words. There is no lack of evidence – however, the work’s novice and even experienced 
readers are inclined to ask: what is this evidence for? Badiou amusingly describes this 
phenomenon, in less kind terms, as he characterizes the later Wittgenstein’s style:  
Between the questions that nobody would dream of raising, the paradoxical and 
promptly contradicted answers, the transformation of each answer into a question and 
vice-versa, the “concrete” examples that are especially abstract, [and] the rhetoric of 
agitated uncertainty: in short, the hystericization of the whole discourse, pushing 
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every supposed reader to the point of vertigo ... the text in the end imposes less a 
position than a deposition. (emphasis added 171) 
On the other hand, Nietzsche is rarely shy to take a position – to loudly voice his claims. The 
slew of evidence and scarce claims in the Investigations contrasts with Human, where we can 
often find a claim in the first (and sometimes only) sentence of Nietzsche’s numbered 
aphorisms. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche titles his remarks. We can even get the gist a 
potential claim from the title alone: in reading the title “Science furthers ability, not 
knowledge” (§256, I) we can almost be certain Nietzsche will make a claim along these lines, 
and indeed he does. When the titles are noun phrases, as they most often are, the claim 
generally acts upon these phrases. 
  Beyond the structural fit of the claim into the aphorism, Nietzsche’s tendency to make 
claims is also evident in a more literary-rhetorical register. His writing is “irreducibly 
hyperbolic” in general, and the hyperbolic style is particularly apt for aphorisms since it is 
startling and draws attention (Nehamas 22, 23). In Human, he is inclined to use words such 
as: “Every girl ... charms alone ... entire life ... has precisely ...” (emphasis added §404, I). In 
his sweeping language, Nietzsche reveals his indebtedness to the French style of maximes: a 
hesitant, unassertive maxim that is shy to generalize is not much of a maxim at all. This style 
of confidence is far bolder than Wittgenstein’s fixation with particularity and specificity. 
Summing up all of this argumentative contrast, we most typically see Nietzsche asserting 
grand claims with a scarcity of evidence – and zero evidence is his shortest aphorisms – 




With this distinction in argumentation made here, a Nietzschean Wittgenstein – if we 
can temporarily allow this absurd term –might conceivably be a full-blown conventional 
philosopher. He would boldly and obviously make a grand claim, as Nietzsche often does 
immediately in his aphorisms, yet would grow quieter as he lays out his grammatical 
remarks, his “reminders for a particular purpose,” his “meaningful sentences about a tooth-
ache”.  He would say what he intends to do philosophically (as the hyperbolic Nietzsche is 
never shy to do) and then show us how (with Wittgenstein’s perspicuous grammatical 
examples). Though truly developing this strange Nietzsche-Wittgenstein hybrid would 
undoubtedly be fraught with problems, this fiction elucidates that their argumentative 
“deficiencies” are on opposite end the spectrum. 
 Ultimately, this complementary quality of their argumentative aberrations appears a 
valuable lesson when set against the ancient question of what is proper philosophical writing.  
If talented imitators of their philosophical style from Human and the Investigations submitted 
articles to mainstream journals, they would be likely rejected on profoundly different 
grounds. When it comes to the communal question of how philosophy ought to be presented, 
this contrast in aphoristic argumentation suggests we discard the model of having an ideal 
standard with various rungs below it. Pitting Wittgenstein contra Nietzsche, the 
argumentation of philosophy reveals something more like a left-to-right political spectrum, 
with perhaps a hyper-evidence “left” and a hyper-assertion “right”. Thinking back to 
Badiou’s palpable irritation with Wittgenstein’s methodological extremism, and the regular 
demands that Nietzsche prove his thought, it is safe advice to write closer to the centre of the 
rather vast continuum between them. Ultimately, however, we see why Wittgenstein and 
 
 82 
Nietzsche, each in his own aphoristic manner, must stick to his guns. If Wittgenstein believes 
that philosophy “simply puts everything before us”, and Nietzsche cannot give conventional 
anti-systematic evidence lest he become entrapped in systematic philosophy, then each 
aphorist is ultimately pursuing the proper means to his destructive ends. In the Investigations, 
the aphoristic form allows Wittgenstein to assemble his ordinary reminders, his grammatical 
lessons-by-example, without broaching the explanatory, theoretical newness of philosophy 
which he holds in contempt. In Human, Nietzsche’s aphorisms render metaphysical and 
systematic philosophy as follies of human psyche, character, and belief, all while being 
deliberately incommensurate in form and style with systematic philosophizing. While these 
aphorists cheat classic argumentation to achieve these ends, they do what they must do: for 







Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Running through our discussion has been a theme of philosophical authenticity, 
though it has not been explicitly identified previously as such. Yet before arriving at this 
exactly, something should be spelled out about our investigation, which considers two 
philosophers of rather different backgrounds and communities. Regardless of the specifics of 
tradition and allegiance, it is intuitive and uncontroversial to ask that Wittgenstein and 
Nietzsche be held accountable: they must practice what they preach. This request, in a way, 
is merely a norm of communal discourse to which most will agree. Though we observe the 
aphoristic form essentially lessening their accountability to helping readers understand their 
remarks and to recover their intentionality, their individual forms of writing passed various 
tests of being coherent with their thought. 
 However, “coherent” is an understatement: we should really say their writing is 
authentic to their thought. In the Investigations and Human, despite radically deviating from 
conventional philosophical argumentative and stylistic norms, our aphorists largely achieve 
this unity between espousal and application. Yet they have no absolute success as 
antiphilosophers: their destructive achievements must be measured according to the specific 
rules to which we hold them. These rules might conceivably exclude classically fallacious 
reasoning (i.e. the ad hominem Nietzsche) and failing to signpost (Wittgenstein’s refusal to 
say what he is doing while he is doing it). These are “deviant” practices: an objector who 
holds traditional argumentation to be essential to philosophy will therein discover a strategy 
for vaporizing Human, All Too Human and Philosophical Investigations into wisps of 
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sophistical smoke.  Imposing a specific set of philosophical standards of discourse upon these 
texts can readily preclude them from being “properly” philosophical. 
Yet simultaneously, according to the present view, this same objector will be rebuffed 
by the formidable consistency of their writing with their thought. The far more challenging 
attack on these texts is that one catches Nietzsche red-handed in the act of philosophical 
systematizing and apprehends Wittgenstein resolutely advancing a philosophical theory. This 
loftier strategy is one that, instead of branding Nietzsche and Wittgenstein as deviants from 
the “ideal” practice of philosophy, would find their views radically inauthentic with their 
methods. We have seen possible points of entry into such a campaign. However, even the 
detractors of these aphoristic philosophers should acknowledge that regardless of these 
aphorists’ purposes, they seemingly exhibit the virtuosity of form harmonized to content. In 
our analysis of the authenticity of their methods, measured with respect to their specific aims, 
we discover a way suppressing the question of divergent traditions. Instead of viewing either 
Nietzsche or Wittgenstein as the true deviant from a fixed reference point – such as the 
typically-analytic philosophy departments or the continentally-savvy literature departments 
of North American universities – we ought to evaluate and appreciate their considerable 
internal coherence.  
At the same time, though, our discussion frames them together through their 
aphoristic philosophical, literary, and rhetorical form.  Aphoristic expression almost predates 
Western philosophy itself – and thus potentially predates questions of philosophy’s ideal 
practice. Indeed Nietzsche, ever the philosophical historian, knew well the ancient age of 
aphoristic thought. In a sketch he made for his unpublished book on Pre-Socratic philosophy, 
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he places a “sporadic-aphoristic” phase of philosophy before a chronological list of 
philosophers running from Thales through Heraclitus to the Pythagoreans and Socrates 
(Early Notebooks 95).  It is fitting that both of our “antiphilosophers” returned to this form 
since the aphorism seemingly predates philosophical propriety – and perhaps with it, the 
often-oppressive disciplinarily of modern and contemporary philosophy and its multi-
departmental guises.    
Practicing what they preach: what could be more proper to a philosopher, even an 
antiphilosopher? The symbiotic affinity of form with content, style with substance – this 
mirroring that we are wont to seek in philosophical, literary, and rhetorical texts – survives 
even Badiou's drastic severing of philosophy and antiphilosophy. The sophist, just as well as 
the dialectician, knows to align means with ends. Even the most critical or destructive 
readings of these texts, which might fairly attack their views on the ends of philosophy, 
should acknowledge their successes in such an alignment. Given the valorization just 
bestowed on the alignment of writing with thought and form with content, it is perhaps 
unsurprising to arrive back at the beginning of our discussion: the question of "philosophy in 
pieces", of Stückwerk philosophy. While we have seen instances of “fragmentary” thought in 
their writings, by and large they achieve a unity of their respective aphoristic forms with their 
chosen anti-philosophical projects -- and that, as we have seen, is saying something. Faced 
with the spectre of perhaps the original antiphilosopher, the ancient aphorist Heraclitus 
whose fragmented thought still exists only to the extent that other ancients quoted it, 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are in rather fine and holistic form today.  
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Ultimately, in the most literary register of style, we have seen Wittgenstein’s remarks 
clash against Nietzsche’s aphorisms: the philosophical indispensability of their form has 
much greater affinity. Yet in discussions of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, the greatest rift of all 
is the stylistic chasm between object-text and interpretive-text. While the present approach 
falls not too far from the centre of stylistic normativity, it is profoundly removed from the 
two works under consideration. It is true that this stylistic chasm could have been widened a 
bit: In Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, Badiou’s reading of the Tractatus has all the stylistic 
contrast of a Heideggerian reading of a car repair manual; some of Nietzsche’s famed readers 
rival or exceed his stylistic decadence in their own writings. Yet it must be remembered that 
Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s readers, and the present approach, all have something of a 
common, non-fragmentary model of writing. It should be suggested that every perspective on 
Human and the Investigations in the guise of an essay, thesis, scholarly book, or article, 
might begin “misreading” these works the instant it applies its own interpretive glue to their 
Stückwerk remarks with the goal of something approximating an essayistic study. These are 
“misreadings” -- largely excellent readings -- in the most affirmative and least pejorative 
sense. The chosen glues for our discussion, the catalysts of our misreading, have been 
roughly historical for Nietzsche, and roughly pedagogical for Wittgenstein. Yet if our 
conclusions are correct on the immense importance of their aphoristic writing, any such 
quasi-essayistic readings from scholars or this discussion must be Hineininterpretierung, for 
they interpret into the works unities that were deliberately and resolutely left out. To 
Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s omissions we ascribe a measure of philosophical and artistic 
success, and in doing so, give some peace to their own doubts about their methods. 
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Lastly. In the remark where Wittgenstein introduces the possibility of his examples 
being “broken off” – in a way, the possibility of his Stückwerk method – we might extract a 
final piece of classically aphoristic wisdom. Aphorisms, after all, are so often held to be 
particularly wise. Though neither Nietzsche nor Wittgenstein appeared to heed this pacifying 
wisdom in their overall careers, the wisdom of halting, stopping, and desisting, its voice and 
message are rather fitting for the practice of aphoristic philosophy and how we now might 
apprehend it. As a largely discontinuous expression of philosophy housed in small pieces, 
this ancient form offers many natural opportunities to cease writing and reading. We have 
seen Nietzsche and Wittgenstein withhold from us, but that is their art. They stop writing, and 
we too can stop reading. Aphoristic philosophy: for both philosopher and interpreter, both 
writer and reader, its peculiar form gives evident breaks, obvious endpoints, and natural stops 
– blank spaces in text and thought that evoke the sense of an ending and the peace that may 
follow. Aphoristic philosophy, being a Stückwerk form, must halt again and again. It stops. 
Or at least offers this opportunity. Wittgenstein aphorizes: 
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy 
when I want to.---The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
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